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THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT'S 
FIRST FIVE YEARS 
By Stuart L. Deutsch * 
The National Environmental Policy Act became effective with 
the new decade of 1970.1 In the first five years of NEPA's history it 
has been interpreted in several sets of guidelines prepared by the 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)2 and other federal agen-
cies.3 In addition, it has been extensively interpreted and analyzed 
by federal courts in almost 500 cases,4 and has been widely discussed 
in many law review articles5 and other literature.8 As a result of the 
extensive activity and debate engendered by NEPA, the effects of 
some aspects of NEPA on federal agency activity have been clearly 
defined and established. But other aspects of NEPA's impact on 
federal agency behavior have been substantially confused and ob-
fuscated. 
This article will survey the requirements of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) within the framework of relevant federal 
guidelines and court decisions of major significance reported prior 
to January 1, 1975. It is hoped that this article will provide the 
reader with a broad overview of NEPA of a sort not often provided 
in NEPA literature, while referring the reader to works of a more 
specific nature (including other articles in this issue of 
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS), which treat in greater depth points made 
generally by this article. 
The first section of the article will analyze the statute as passed 
by Congress together with the applicable executive order and CEQ 
regulations. Court interpretations will be discussed in a later sec-
tion. 
I. NEPA, EXECUTIVE ORDER 11514, AND THE CEQ GUIDELINES 
A. Purposes of NEPA 
Section 2 of NEPA sets out the purposes of the Act: 
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoy-
3 
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able harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts 
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and bio-
sphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the under-
standing of the ecological systems and natural resources important to 
the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.7 
The act is divided into two titles;8 the first entitled "Declaration 
of National Environmental Policy" and the second entitled "Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality." 
B. Title One 
Title I both establishes broad policy goals which are intended to 
set a tenor and a style for governmental activity, and imposes spe-
cific obligations on all federal agencies. It will be helpful for analysis 
to separate the specific "action-forcing" requirements of the Title 
from the broader statements which mayor may not create enforcea-
ble agency obligations and individual rights. 9 
1. Broad Policy Statements 
NEPA begins with a subsection which declares a general Congres-
sional concern for the complex interdependencies of natural and 
human life, and an expectation that federal agencies will take into 
account such interdependencies before engaging in any activity. 
The goal of this agency forethought is to restore and maintain envi-
ronmental qualitylO since there is a direct relation between that 
quality and "the overall welfare and development of man."11 
Accordingly, the section states: 
[T]hat it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in coop-
eration with State and local governments, and other concerned public 
and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, 
including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to 
foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain condi-
tions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and 
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future 
generations of Americans.12 
This policy is not focused exclusively on environmental factors, 
since other goals such as social and economic well-being are also 
recognized as important to the general welfare. 13 Thus, the continu-
ing responsibility of Federal agencies to carry out NEPA's broad 
policies is tempered by the requirement that agency actions be 
"consistent with other essential considerations of national policy." 
Federal agencies need only "use all practicable means" to achieve 
NEPA's endsY 
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More specific enunciation of Congress' broad environmental goals 
is offered in subsection 101 (b): 
(1) [To] [f]ulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee 
of the environment for succeeding generations; 
(2) [To] [a]ssure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, 
and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; 
(3) [To] [a]ttain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environ-
ment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable 
and unintended consequences; 
(4) [To] [p]reserve important historical, cultural, and natural 
aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an 
environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice; 
(5) [To] [a]chieve a balance between population and resource use 
which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's 
amenities; and 
(6) [To] [e]nhance the quality of renewable resources and ap-
proach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources. 15 
This listing of goals touches upon many factors and themes, but can 
be capsulized as an expression of an almost utopian hope to estab-
lish conditions in which the material, spiritual and cultural needs 
of the living will be satisfied as fully as possible, while maximizing 
environmental quality and preserving the nation's cultural heritage 
for the benefit of present and future generations. 
Notably, through NEPA: "The Congress recognizes that each per-
son should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has 
a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement 
of the environment."16 In addition to individual agency effort, Con-
gress also hoped to encourage cooperation between various compo-
nents of state, national, and international organizations by assert-
ing that: 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possi-
ble: ... (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-.... 
(E) Recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environ-
mental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the 
United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and 
programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipat-
ing and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environ-
ment; 
(F) Make available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, 
and individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintain-
ing, and enhancing the quality of the environment. 17 
Finally, Congress attempted to alter the attitude and posture of 
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the federal government and its components toward environmental 
preservation: 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possi-
ble: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States 
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set 
forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government 
shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure 
the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environ-
mental design arts in planning and in decision-making which may have 
an impact on man's environment; . . . . 
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recom-
mended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved· 
conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources; .... 
(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and de-
velopment of resource-oriented projects; and 
(H) assist the Council on Environmental Quality . 18 
2. "Action-forcing" Sections. 
NEPA's broad policy declarations provide the background for 
specific action-forcing procedural requirements which have had a 
dramatic and substantial impact on federal agency decision-
making. IV The most significant of these provisions is § l02(2)(C), 
which establishes the requirement for an environmental impact 
statement: 
[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government shall-.... (C) include in 
every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other 
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on -
(i) The environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented. 
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal offi-
cial shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency 
which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any 
environmental impact involved. Copies of such statements and the com-
ments and views of the appropriate Federal, State and local agencies, 
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which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, 
shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental 
Quality and to the public . . . . and shall accompany the proposal 
through the existing agency review processes .... 20 
The requirement for an environmental impact statement is not 
the only action-forcing provision. Subsection (B) states that federal 
agencies shall 
identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the 
Council on Environmental Quality. . . which will insure that presently 
unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appro-
priate consideration in decision-making along with economic and tech-
nical considerations. 21 
NEPA also required an immediate review of 
present statutory authority, administrative regulations, and current 
policies and procedures for the purpose of determining whether there are 
any deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which prohibit full compli-
ance with the purposes and provisions of[NEPA) .... 22 
and required that by July 1, 1971 the President be apprised of "such 
measures as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies 
into conformity with the intent, purposes, and procedures"23 of 
NEPA. 
3. Expansion of Functions 
Title I also includes provisions which make it clear that NEPA is 
to be interpreted as an addition to the functions and duties of all 
parts of the federal government, and not as a substitute for existing 
obligations. NEPA states that its provisions will not 
in any way affect the specific statutory obligations of any Federal agency 
(1) to comply with criteria and standards of environmental quality, (2) 
to coordinate or consult with any other Federal or State agency, or (3) 
to act, or refrain from acting, contingent upon the recommendations or 
certification of any other Federal or State agency.24 
The Act goes on, in a later section, to state explicitly that the 
"policies and goals set forth in this chapter are supplementary to 
those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agencies. "25 
C. Title II 
The second part of NEPA establishes the Council on Environ-
mental Quality28 and defines its membership and duties. Besides 
assisting in the preparation of the annual Environmental Quality 
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Report,27 CEQ is to monitor "conditions and trends in the quality 
of the environment", and "analyze and interpret" its findings to 
determine "whether such conditions and trends are interfering, or 
are likely to interfere, with the achievement of the policy . . . [of 
NEPA]."28 CEQ also is authorized to develop national environmen-
tal policies and goals, and gather and assess various kinds of rele-
vant environmental data.28 Most important from the viewpoint of 
federal agencies, CEQ is given an oversight role with regard to 
NEPA's implementation since it is empowered 
to review and appraise the various programs and activities of the Fed-
eral Government in the light of the policy set forth in . . . [NEPA] for 
the purpose of determining the extent to which such programs and 
activities are contributing to the achievement of such policy, and to 
make recommendations to the President with respect thereto.30 
D. Executive Order 11514 
Executive Order 11514,31 issued March 5, 1970, is the key docu-
ment specifying the duties of the Council on Environmental Quality 
regarding environmental impact statements and its interrela-
tionship with other government agencies whose actions are affected 
by NEPA. The Order directs CEQ to perform many functions ,32 
including evaluation of existing and proposed activities and public 
education programs relating to the environment. Most significantly, 
the Order authorizes CEQ to 
(h) Issue guidelines to Federal agencies for the preparation of de-
tailed statements on proposals for legislation and other Federal actions 
affecting the environment, as required by section l02(2)(C) of the Act. 
(i) Issue such other instructions to agencies, and request such re-
ports and other information from them, as may be required to carry out 
the Council's responsibilities under the Act.33 
It is under this authority that CEQ Guidelines and recommenda-
tions for NEPA's implementations have been promulgated. 
E. CEQ Guidelines 
Under the authority granted it by the President through Execu-
tive Order 11514, CEQ has promulgated four sets of guidelines34 for 
federal agencies to use as a basis for promulgating their own regula-
tions implementing NEPA.35 Interim guidelines were published in 
May, 197038 and were replaced by guidelines dated April 23, 1971.37 
In May, 1972, a memorandum for agencies was published.38 The 
guidelines currently in force were promulgated on August 1, 1973.38 
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The new guidelines apply to all environmental impact statements 
(EIS's) prepared after January 28, 1974}0 
It should be noted that federal courts have generally stated that 
the Guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory, since CEQ has 
no statutory authority to promulgate them.41 However, courts have 
used the guidelines to determine a reasonable approach to an issue 
raised by NEPA and have required compliance where the guidelines 
have been adopted by agencies as their own.42 
1. The First Permanent Guidelines 
Although now officially superseded, it will be useful to consider 
the April 23, 1971 guidelines in detail, since they have been the 
operating guide during much of the life of NEPA, and since many 
of their procedures were incorporated into the present guidelines. 
The guidelines established the basic structure of the environmen-
tal impact statement requirement for federal agencies. First, the 
guidelines make it clear that "all agencies of the Federal govern-
ment" must comply with NEPA requirements. 43 However, in a spe-
cific instance an agency may be freed of the duty to file a particular 
EIS otherwise required if "existing law applicable to the agency's 
operations expressly prohibits or makes compliance impossible." 
Not only are all agencies included in the requirement, but "[a]s 
early as possible and in all cases prior to agency decision concerning 
major action or recommendation ... that significantly affects the 
environment, Federal agencies will ... assess in detail the poten-
tial environmental impact ... "44 To carry out this requirement, 
each agency was required to draft formal procedures for compliance 
with NEPA.45 The agency regulations must cover such aspects of 
compliance as identifying agency action which will require an EIS;46 
consultation and review process for drafting and revising the EIS;47 
designation of officials responsible for drafting the EIS;48 and a pro-
cedure for "timely public information on federal plans and pro-
grams with environmental impact."49 
The guidelines attempt a detailed analysis of what is "a major 
federal action significantly affecting the quality of human environ-
ment. "50 "Actions" include: 
(i) Recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation in-
cluding that for appropriations .... 
(ii) Projects and continuing activities: directly undertaken by Fed-
eral agencies; supported in whole or part through Federal contracts, 
grants, subsidies, loans or other forms of funding assistance; involving 
a Federal lease, permit, license, certificate or other entitlement for use; 
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(iii) Policy, regulations and procedure-making.51 
According to the 1971 CEQ guidelines, the phrase "major federal 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment" is to be treated expansively in federal agency regulations 
implementing NEPA, and is to include a maximum number of situ-
ations. Thus, "the overall, cumulative impact of the action pro-
posed" is to be considered, and even if the effect is only "localized" 
it may still require an EIS "if there is potential that the environ-
ment may be significantly affected."52 
The cumulative impact of a series of actions must be considered, 
even if the actions are not exclusively taken by one agency,53 and 
an EIS prepared whenever there is a cumulatively significant im-
pact.54 To determine whether there is a sufficient cumulative im-
pact, the agency should include in its consideration federal actions 
begun prior to the passage ofNEPA.55 However, if the basic program 
cannot be reviewed, the agency should consider at least the effects 
of program increments occurring after NEPA's effective date. 56 And, 
in all cases where the government action "is likely to be highly 
controversial" an EIS should be preparedY 
The EIS must consider the proposed agency action in light of the 
widest possible "range of aspects of the environment, "58 and must 
recognize "both beneficial and detrimental effects, even if, on bal-
ance, the agency believes that the effect will be beneficial."59 Detri-
mental effects are to be defined broadly in federal agency regula-
tions to include "both those that directly affect human beings and 
those that indirectly affect human beings through adverse effects on 
the environment."6o These effects could include degradation of envi-
ronmental quality, loss of some beneficial uses of the environment61 
and actions that "serve short-term, to the disadvantage of long-
term, environmental goals. "62 
The 1971 CEQ guidelines specified that each federal agency's 
EIS's shall include a description of the proposed action in sufficient 
detail to allow others to assess the likely environmental impact.63 
Furthermore, each EIS must set forth the agency's analysis of the 
probable environmental impact of the proposed action, including 
both primary and secondary impacts.64 The CEQ guidelines specifi-
cally mentioned that "the implications, if any, ... for population 
distribution or concentration"65 and "the effect of any possible 
change in population patterns upon the resource base"66 should be 
discussed in agency EIS's. Unavoidable adverse effects on the envi-
ronment, moreover, had to be specified.67 
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The EIS must discuss "[a]ltematives to the proposed action" so 
as to provide "[a] rigorous exploration and objective evaluation of 
alternative actions ... " and prevent foreclosure of preferable op-
tions.68 It must also discuss "[t]he relationship between local short-
term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhance-
ment of long-term productivity."68 As a related concern the EIS 
must specify "[a]ny irreversible and irretrievable commitments of 
resources" which might result from implementation of the pro-
posaUo 
Finally, the EIS must discuss "problems and objections" raised 
by "Federal, State and local agencies and by private organizations 
and individuals" in connection with their examination of draft 
EIS's which are to be circulated to them for comment.71 To enable 
such comments to be meaningful, the guidelines required that a 
draft EIS be written and circulated as soon as a draft statement 
could be prepared which would provide an adequate foundation for 
comment.72 To facilitate circulation of draft EIS's, the guidelines 
suggested a list of agencies to be consulted for specific impacts.73 To 
ensure that the review process was effectual, the agency proposing 
action was directed by the guidelines to establish minimum periods 
of at least 30 days for comments from other agencies.74 Further, the 
regulations stated: 
To the maximum extent practicable no administrative action. . . is to 
be taken sooner than ninety (90) days after a draft environmental state-
ment has been circulated for comment . . . [N]either should such 
administrative action be taken sooner than thirty (30) days after the 
final text of an environmental statement. . . has been made available 
75 
Where legislative proposals are involved, the EIS must have been 
made available during consideration of the legislation.76 
Finally, the regulations emphasized that public involvement and 
input into federal decision-making should be expanded to the maxi-
mum possible.77 Public hearings were recommended whenever ap-
propriate.78 
2. The May, 1972 Recommendations 
The May, 1972 Memorandum was a supplementary group of 
"Recommendations for Improving Agency NEPA Procedures."78 It 
was intended to answer specific questions which had arisen under 
the 1971 Guidelines as they were applied to a broad range of actions. 
The first CEQ recommendation was that "[a]gencies should 
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develop a list of the full range of impacts likely to be involved in 
the typical types of actions they undertake."80 This list would in-
clude secondary as well as primary impacts, and would assist in the 
determination of whether a major action with a significant impact 
was involved. 
The recommendations also emphasized that "the range of im-
pacts cannot be limited to the traditional area of agency involve-
ment or expertise."81 Rather, the agency must consider impacts and 
problems beyond its ordinary area of operation, and, indeed, must 
even consider reasonable program alternatives which it cannot carry 
out under present authorization.82 
The Memorandum also clarifies the obligation of agencies to bal-
ance advantages and disadvantages of proposed actions, especially 
where non-environmental factors enter the balance. The non-
environmental factors must be mentioned and briefly discussed in 
the EIS.83 
Related to this balancing problem is the problem of balancing 
opposing views of the proposed action and its results. The Memo-
randum makes clear that "responsible views", from whatever 
source, should be acknowledged and discussed in the EIS.84 To as-
sure full compliance, "all substantive comments received on the 
draft should be attached to the final statement, whether or not each 
such comment is thought to merit individual discussion ... "85 
The Memorandum also makes clear that when discussing alterna-
tives to a specific action, an agency should consider "the alternative 
of no action."88 
The recommendations deal with several important procedural 
points as well. Each agency was expected to develop "an appropri-
ate early notice system" to inform other agencies and the public of 
its plans to draft an EIS.87 More specifically, each agency was to 
adopt measures to assure that draft EIS's were publicized and made 
available early in the review process so as to allow maximum time 
for analysis and reply by interested agencies and individuals.88 The 
Memorandum noted that each EIS should clearly indicate the 
source and availability of the factual statements and findings relied 
upon by the agency in the EIS88 so that such agency information 
would be open to the criticism of outside commentators. 
The CEQ recommendations also defined more clearly the concept 
of a "lead agency" first introduced in the 1971 guidelines to deal 
with situations where several agencies are involved in a project.80 
The purpose of designating a "lead agency" is to allow a given EIS 
to be written under the direction of a single agency which fully 
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evaluates all the environmental effects of a project executed by two 
or more agencies. However, if it seems more efficient to draft a joint 
statement, agencies may elect to do so as long as the resultant EIS 
meets the required standards.91 
Finally, in many instances an agency develops a series of individ-
ual projects which are really part of one program. Here, CEQ recom-
mended that a general program EIS be drafted if it will serve a 
useful purpose. But particular impacts of individual projects also 
should be detailed in a separate EIS "in order to complete the 
analysis. "92 
3. The Present Guidelines 
The guidelines now in effect were issued in August, 1973 and cover 
all draft and final EIS's filed with the CEQ after January 28, 1974.93 
Most of the principles and basic procedural framework established 
by the earlier guidelines have been incorporated into the current 
version. However, the new guidelines exhibit greater precision and 
clarity of purpose. For example, under present procedures, it is clear 
that environmental considerations are to be treated as co-equal with 
other, more traditional ones: "initial assessments of the environ-
mental impacts of proposed action should be undertaken concur-
rently with initial technical and economic studies .... "94 
The EIS review process is also more precisely shaped to provide 
a forum for the discussion of alternatives to the proposed action: "In 
particular, agencies should use the environmental impact statement 
process to explore alternative actions that will avoid or minimize 
adverse impacts ... "95 
The guidelines make clear that NEPA has made environmental 
protection part of the raison d'etre of every federal agency: "[e]ach 
agency shall interpret the provisions of the Act as a supplement to 
its existing authority and as a mandate to view traditional policies 
and missions in the light of the Act's national environmental objec-
tives."96 However, the present guidelines go on to recognize that in 
exceptional cases agency authorizing legislation could "expressly 
prohibit or make compliance [with NEPA] impossible." 
As before, there is a definition of "major federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment." The words 
"major" and "significant" are expressly defined as setting "thresh-
olds of importance and impact that must be met before a statement 
is required."97 "Federal" denotes a sufficient level of "control" and 
"responsibility" for the action on the part of the federal actor.98 
The new guidelines more explicitly define the obligation to draft 
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broad program statements. They are to be developed "to assess the 
environmental effects of a number of individual actions on a given 
geographic area ... or environmental impacts that are generic or 
common to a series of agency actions. . . or the overall impact of 
a large-scale program or chain of contemplated projects ... "99 
Where appropriate, additional statements are required for indi-
vidual segments of the program if their environmental aspects have 
not yet been previously analyzed in full. lOO Furthermore, 
"[a]gencies engaging in major technological research and develop-
ment programs should develop procedures for periodic evaluation to 
determine when a program statement is required for such pro-
grams."IOI To satisfy this requirement the agency should take into 
account "the magnitude of Federal investment in the program, the 
likelihood of widespread application of the technology, the degree 
of environmental impact which would occur if the technology were 
widely applied, and the extent to which continued investment in the 
new technology is likely to restrict future alternatives."102 
The appropriate time for preparing such a program statement can 
be very difficult to determine. Therefore, the regulations attempt to 
provide guidance: 
Statements must be written late enough in the development process to 
contain meaningful information, but early enough so that this informa-
tion can practically serve as an input on the decision-making pro-
cess .... In any case, a statement must be prepared before research 
activities have reached a stage of investment or commitment to imple-
mentation likely to determine subsequent development or restrict later 
alternatives. 103 
If at any stage in development of a program a decision is made to 
defer preparation of a program EIS or not to prepare a program EIS 
at all, an "evaluation" must be written to justify the decision: 
[T]he agency should prepare an evaluation briefly setting forth the 
reasons for its determination that a statement is not yet necessary. This 
evaluation should be periodically updated, particularly when significant 
new information becomes available concerning the potential environ-
mental impact of the program. l04 
The appropriate scope of such a program statement can be diffi-
cult to determine. The guidance offered in the guidelines is general, 
but clearly demonstrates an intention to stimulate thorough studies 
of alternative actions involving as many agencies or other sources 
of input as possible. Thus, the'guidelines call for "an analysis not 
only of alternative forms of the same technology that might reduce 
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any adverse environmental impacts but also of alternative technolo-
gies that would serve the same function as the technology under 
consideration" [emphasis added).105 
The guidelines recommend that federal agencies and interested 
groups with "relevant expertise in the preparation of such state-
ments"108 be involved in the EIS preparation process. Additionally, 
"a systematic interdisciplinary approach" is called for, to integrate 
natural and social sciences and environmental design into the plan-
ning process. 107 
A problem resulting from the enormous output of EIS's under 
NEPA has been the inability of outside organizations and other 
federal agencies to keep track of all the programs and projects of an 
agency which might affect the environment. In an attempt to meet 
NEPA's policy of full disclosure and input from all sources, the 
guidelines require the establishment of "an appropriate early notice 
system for informing the public."108 To effectuate the notice system, 
all agencies are required to "(1) maintain a list of administrative 
actions for which environmental statements are being prepared; (2) 
revise the list at regular intervals ... (but not less than quarterly) 
... ; and (3) make the list available for public inspection on re-
quest. "109 
Since a copy of the list will be sent to CEQ, further public dissem-
ination will be guaranteed by regular publication in the Federal 
Register ,no 
The 1973 guidelines are more detailed concerning the contents of 
an EIS, and recognize for the first time the concept of a "negative 
determination"l1l i.e., a written explanation of a decision not to 
prepare an EIS for a given action. 
The draft EIS is the key document in the EIS process, since it is 
written early in the agency's decision-making process, and accom-
panies a proposal through the review process. 1I2 Recognizing this 
importance, the guidelines require that "[t]he draft statement 
must fulfill and satisfy to the fullest extent possible at the time the 
draft is prepared the requirements established for final statements 
... "113 Since the drafts, like the final EIS's, have utility largely as 
an aid in the agency decision-making process, they "are to serve as 
the means of assessing the environmental impact of proposed 
agency actions, rather than as a justification for decisions already 
made."114 
Two other preliminary questions concerning the procedure for 
EIS preparation are dealt with in the guidelines. First, the question 
of how NEPA requirements should be met when several agencies are 
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involved in a single project is explained in more detail. Either a lead 
agency statement or a joint statement is acceptable, provided the 
EIS meets all standards for content and timing. 1I5 The possibility 
is left open for each agency to prepare its own EIS on the project, 
however, where that procedure seems best suited to satisfy the re-
quirements of NEPA.1I8 Second, the guidelines deal with the ques-
tion of preparation of an EIS by an outsider rather than the agency 
responsible for the action: "In all cases, the agency should make its 
own evaluation of the environmental issues and take responsibility 
for the scope and content of draft and final environmental state-
ments." [emphasis added]117 This guideline is ambiguous concern-
ing the propriety of an outside contractor or even an applicant for 
federal permission or assistance preparing an EIS which is merely 
evaluated and adopted by the responsible agency. Courts have split 
on this issue, and it remains an unsettled area of the law.Hs 
The requisite contents of an EIS have been clarified and ex-
panded by the new CEQ guidelines. Eight components are to be 
included in the statement in "a form easily understood, both by 
members of the public and by public decisionmakers."lIB 
(1) A description of the proposed action, a statement of its pur-
poses, and a description of the environment affected. . . adequate 
to permit an assessment of projected environmental impact. . . . 
The statement should also succinctly describe the environment of 
the area affected as it exists prior to the proposed action . .. 120 
Under this section, agencies must present an analysis of "interre-
lationships and cumulative environmental impacts of the proposed 
action and other related Federal projects ... "121 In addition, they 
must discuss "population and growth characteristics of the affected 
area" and explain their assumptions concerning likely impacts of 
the project on population growth. l22 To standardize assumptions, 
specific growth projection projects should be consulted. 123 
(2) The relationship of the proposed action to land use plans, poli-
cies, and controls for the affected area. 124 
Included in this analysis, among other things, would be the im-
pact of the proposal on strategies developed under the Clear Air Act 
and Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 125 
(3) The probable impact of the proposed action on the environ-
ment. (i) This requires agencies to assess positive and negative ef-
fects . .. as [they affect] both the national and international envi-
ronment. (ii) Secondary or indirect, as well as primary or direct, 
consequences for the environment. . .128 
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This requirement, although pivotal to an effective EIS, can be 
particularly difficult to fulfill. Secondary environmental effects in-
clude, for instance, "associated investments and changed patterns 
of social and economic activities"127 and thus can include a wide 
range of relatively remote consequences. The guidelines describe as 
secondary those "impacts on existing community facilities and ac-
tivities, ... inducing new facilities and activities, ... [and] 
changes in natural conditions ... "128 and recognize that these ef-
fects "may often be even more substantial than the primary effects 
of the original action itself."129 
(4) Alternatives to the proposed action, including, where relevant, 
those not within the existing authority of the responsible agency. 130 
Among the alternatives to be considered are "the alternative of 
taking no action or of postponing action"131 as well as that of substi-
tuting different projects. 
(5) Any probable adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided. . . 132 
These effects could be on air or water quality, wildlife, land use 
patterns, urban congestion, health threats and so on. 
(6) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
productivity. 133 
This section requires a discussion of trade-offs, focusing particu-
larly on the impact of the proposal on various future options. 
(7) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
that would be involved in the proposed action should it be 
implemented. 134 
(8) An indication of what other interests and considerations of 
Federal policy are thought to offset the adverse environmental ef-
fects of the proposed action. . .135 
These sections would require discussions, for example, of the need 
for economic development as another policy influencing Federal 
decision-making. 138 Where cost/benefit analyses have been made by 
the agency, they should be included in the EIS with an explanation 
of the weight given environmental costs which are not quantified. 137 
The review process for the draft EIS is also more completely delin-
eated in the new guidelines. Review opportunities should be avail-
able for other Federal agencies, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, State agencies, local agencies and the public. 138 Federal and 
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joint Federal-state agencies are listed in an appendix to the guide-
lines for consultation during the draft EIS stage when specific envi-
ronmentalproblems are involved. 139 The Environmental Protection 
Agency is empowered by lawl40 to comment on the environmental 
impact of agency actions affecting air or water quality, noise abate-
ment, pesticides, solid waste disposal, radiation and other environ-
mental factors. State and local agencies are to be consulted when-
ever appropriate. 141 Finally, public participation in the review pro-
cess is to be encouraged and assisted as much as practicable. 142 All 
outside reviewers of agency EIS's are to be given at least 45 days to 
comment. 143 The Council on Environmental Quality must receive 
copies of all EIS's prepared in draft or final form.144 
After this review process, the final EIS is drafted. The final EIS 
should discuss "all major points of view on the environmental ef-
fects of the proposed action and its alternatives"145 and shape its 
discussions to consider "any responsible opposing view" to its deci-
sions and analysis. us To facilitate the consideration, "all substan-
tive comments" should be made part of the final statement. 147 As 
before, no administrative action should be undertaken within 90 
days after circulation of the draft EIS, or within 30 days after com-
pletion of the final EIS.148 
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF NEPA 
While NEPA itself and the CEQ guidelines have provided a sub-
stantial guide for agency behavior, there are many ambiguities and 
problem areas remaining. As a result, federal courts have been in-
volved in a detailed case-by-case consideration of virtually all as-
pects of the preparation and adequacy of environmental impact 
statements. Therefore, it is necessary to supplement and explain the 
duties of federal agencies under NEPA by an analysis of court deci-
sions involving the Act, which now number almost five hundred in 
just five years. l48 
The voluminous judicial interpretation of NEPA has focused al-
most exclusively on the EIS procedural requirement. Accordingly, 
the discussion of judicial opinions that follows will have a similar 
focus, even though NEPA imposes other important but less litigated 
duties. To facilitate analysis, we shall consider the court decisions 
under several headings. This part of the article will first analyze 
court treatment of threshold problems for application of NEPA's 
EIS requirement, including: what constitutes a "Major federal ac-
tion significantly affecting the quality of the human environment"; 
and, at what point in relation to a federal action must an EIS be 
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prepared. It is important to note that these threshold issues have 
relevance only for NEPA's impact statement procedures. NEPA's 
other requirements are not similarly limited in their application. 150 
Second, we will consider the adequacy of the EIS: was it prepared 
by the responsible federal official; does it contain all the elements 
required by NEPA and the guidelines; does it properly discuss alter-
natives; and does it fully reveal the environmental issues for the 
federal decision-makers and the public. Thirdly, we will consider 
whether NEPA imposes substantive duties on federal agencies to 
proceed only with environmentally sound projects or projects which 
are socially justifiable in spite of their environmental consequences. 
A. Threshold Issues 
1. What is a major federal action significantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment? 
The problem of defining the events that trigger NEPA's require-
ment that an impact statement be prepared has been presented to 
federal courts in many guises; those courts have observed that this 
threshold question is composed of several sub-issues. 
Thus, there are cases which analyze what is a "federal" action,151 
what is a "major" action,152 what "significantly affects the quality 
of the environment"153 and what is meant by the quality of the 
"human environment."154 
a) Federal action. 
Any construction or other program which is directly carried out 
by a federal agency is clearly a federal action. 155 Moreover, the con-
cept of a federal action has been broadly defined by courts in ac-
cordance with the CEQ guidelines, and usually any substantial fed-
eral connection with the project is sufficient to bring it under 
NEPA's coverage.158 The requisite extent of federal action is less 
clear, however, when the federal agency is not directly carrying out 
a project, but is only supplying funding for a project, offering only 
partial funding for planning or other preliminary purposes, or 
merely licensing a private or state activity. 
Thus, in Hiram Clark Civic Club v. Lynn,157 the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, while finding that a HUD decision not to prepare 
an EIS was valid, accepted the argument that HUD's mortgage 
insurance program constituted federal action. 
In Ely v. Velde,158 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
the use of funds by the State of Virginia which had been granted as 
a "no-strings" block grant by the Law Enforcement Assistance 
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Administration (LEAA) constituted a federal action which sub-
jected LEAA to the duty to prepare an EIS. However, the court 
concluded that if the state made no use of the granted funds and 
refunded them to the Federal Government, the project would not 
irrevocably be considered federal: "While the center itself is not 
branded as federal, the LEAA funds allocated for its construction 
were impressed with a commitment to preserve the environment 
"159 
In Davis v. Morton,180 the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
a lease of land on an Indian reservation was federal action even 
though no federal agency was a party to it, since the Department of 
Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs was required to approve the lease 
prior to its execution. The decision rejected the District Court's 
conclusion that no federal action was possible unless there is federal 
initiation of, participation in or benefit from a project. l81 Along the 
same lines are cases holding license decisions by agencies such as 
the Atomic Energy Commission to be federal actions, even though 
no federal funds are used for the projects.182 Thus, federal regulation 
of the subject area and granting of permission seems, under some 
circumstances, sufficient to make an action physically executed by 
non-federal parties "federal" for purposes of NEPA. 
Perhaps the best way to determine the amount of federal contact 
necessary to create a federal action is to consider that handful of 
cases in which an action was not considered federal. The most su-
prising case, since it appears to conflict with other authority is City 
of Boston v. Volpe. 183 There, the First Circuit held that construction 
of an airport runway at Boston's Logan Airport was not a federal 
project. The court reached this conclusion because at the time of the 
suit the state authority constructing the runway had only applied 
for federal assistance and had not received any federal commitment 
for funding. Indeed, prior to this litigation the FAA had specifically 
withheld approval of the project for federal funding because the port 
authority's proposed negative declaration did not satisfy NEPA, 
and the proposed runway would violate non-NEPA environmental 
standards. 
The court was not persuaded by the argument that the runway 
involved was a stage of an expansion project, other parts of which 
were federally funded: 
We do not accept the general proposition that once the federal govern-
ment has participated in a development, that development is necessar-
ily forever federal. Many projects have federal assistance at an explora-
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tory stage and are then completed through wholly local or state fund-
ing.164 
Further: 
Nor does the Port Authority's present intention eventually to seek 
federal funds for yet another stretch of taxiway make the Outer Taxiway 
a federal project. Similarly, the adoption of certain federal standards 
and specifications in the hope of qualifying for federal assistance cannot 
transform a state or local project into a federal one.165 
That the decision is aberrant can be seen from the other cases 
finding no federal action. In Kitchen v. FCC168 the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court found that the construction of a local tele-
phone exchange building financed exclusively by the telephone 
company was not a federal action. The court was persuaded that the 
project was not federal partially because the state public utilities 
commission had considered the environmental issues raised in the 
federal case.167 
In Highland Park v. Train,168 plaintiffs attempted to block con-
struction of a large shopping center along a highway undergoing 
improvement. Among other things, they argued that NEPA had not 
been complied with. The court, however, found that 
... no federal funds have been used, approved, or applied for, and that 
the state has not even "programmed" the project as an undertaking 
eligible for federal funds allocated to the state .... The only conceiva-
ble relevant federal contact ... has been designation of a two-mile and 
adjacent V2 mile portion of the highway as parts of the Federal Aid 
Secondary System in 1941 and 1958, respectively, long before the pres-
ent expansion plans were considered .169 
Given this very tenuous connection to federal programs, the court 
found that there was no federal action involved. 
In Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe,170 the court found federal 
action but expressed its feeling that federal involvement could be 
so minor, either because a project was at a stage too preliminary to 
request federal aid, or was too removed from a project receiving 
federal aid, that no federal action would be involved. 171 A good ex-
ample of that principle is Bradford Township v. Illinois Highway 
Authority,172 in which a state highway was found not federal al-
though other parts of the system had been built with federal aid. 
Another case finding no federal action is Biderman v. Morton. l73 
In Biderman, plaintiff attempted to block local government land 
use permissions on the parts of Fire Island, New York, which had 
not been acquired by the federal government for the Fire Island 
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National Seashore. While very sympathetic to the plaintiffs,174 the 
court found that the municipal land use decisions within their re-
spective jurisdictions (as expressly allowed under the Fire Island 
National Seashore Act) were not subject to NEPA requirements: 
To be sure, it is well settled that non-federal parties may be enjoined, 
pending completion of an EIS, where those non-federal entities have 
entered into a partnership or joint venture with the Federal Govern-
ment, and are thus recipients of federal funding. [cites omitted] ... 
In this case, however, there is no contention that the municipal defen-
dants solicited federal aid in any way and, indeed, it is the very lack of 
cooperative effort between the federal and municipal defendants which 
has so rankled appellants. 
Nor is this a case in which non-federal action cannot lawfully begin 
or continue without the prior approval of a federal agency.17S 
The only link the plaintiffs could offer to show federal action was 
that the Secretary of the Interior was authorized to purchase land 
on Fire Island which he felt to be zoned inconsistently with the goals 
of Fire Island National Seashore.178 
Another recent highway case finding no federal action is Citizens 
for a Balanced Environment v. Volpe. 177 This case seems aberrant 
since it found that one segment of a highway was not "federal" even 
though federal funds had been used to build a small section, the 
state had acted to keep the project eligible for federal funding, the 
road directly tied into a highway segment which had previously 
been enjoined as a federal project,178 and it was part of a federal 
highway subject to a court order that an overall EIS be drafted.179 
A final case finding no federal action is Proetta v. Dent.t80 In 
Proetta, residents of an area being cleared by the City of New York 
attempted to enjoin the destruction of their homes on the theory 
that New York was clearing the area to help a business with a 
federal loan to expand its plant. The court found that since New 
York City was using its own funds and that the federal loan would 
only be made available at a later stage in the project, there was no 
federal action to enjoin. 181 The court emphasized in its decision that: 
". . . if the project site is not cleared by the deadline. . . appellee 
[company] has indicated that it will not continue with its expan-
sion but will indeed leave Brooklyn, with the City losing hundreds 
of jobs accordingly."182 Thus, the court seemed more interested in 
saving the jobs for New York City than in considering whether a 
federal action was involved. 
The very paucity of the cases finding no federal action, and the 
minimal federal contacts in most of them, show that as a general 
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rule the threshold determination that an action is or is not federal 
is not a difficult one to make. 
b) Major action significantly affecting the environment. 
An analysis of this concept is somewhat difficult to conduct since 
it has been treated so differently by different courts. 183 Since concep-
tually it is possible to have a major action which has no significant 
environmental effect and, conversely, it is possible to have a non-
major action with significant effect, some courts have treated this 
issue as containing two separate threshold elements; i.e. "major 
action" and "action significantly affecting the environment."184 
Other courts have treated the statutory phrase as imposing one 
standard, reasoning that the expansive purpose of NEP A counsels 
that any act with a significant effect must be a major one, and vice 
versa. 185 
Regardless of this disagreement, however, courts have tended to 
find "major actions significantly affecting the environment" when-
ever federal activities are involved. For example, river channelling 
and dam construction activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers are clearly major actions significantly affecting the environ-
ment,188 as are decisions to grant Atomic Energy Commission licen-
ses and to revoke government contracts to purchase helium from 
private producers. 187 
Perhaps the most recent analysis of this threshold issue is found 
in Minnesota Public Interest Research Group (MPIRG) u. Butz, 
decided on June 10, 1974.188 MPIRG deals with U.S. Dept. of Agri-
culture Forest Service logging contracts in the Boundary Waters 
Canoe area of Minnesota. The court, at the outset of its analysis, 
recognized that: 
The threshold question as to whether there is a major federal action 
... is not presented in the majority of cases; there is little question that 
when the federal government commits millions of dollars to build dams, 
nuclear power plants or highways there is a major federal action. 189 
However, in MPIRG the question was whether either the Forest 
Service's pre-NEPA extension and modification of contracts or their 
post-NEPA administrative actions to carry out those contracts con-
stituted major federal action significantly affecting the environ-
ment. 
The Forest Service argued that its actions: 
... must be isolated from the subsequent impact on the environment 
from logging operations. They assert that the statutory phrase. . . cre-
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ates two tests. First, it must be determined whether there is a major 
federal action; next, if there is a major action, the impact of that action 
on the environment must be determined. l80 
The court rejected this line of argument: 
To separate the consideration of the magnitude of federal action from 
its impact on the environment does little to foster the purposes of the 
Act. . . By bifurcating the statutory language, it would be possible to 
speak of a "minor federal action significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment," and to hold NEPA inapplicable to such an ac-
tion. Yet if the action has a significant effect, it is the intent of NEPA 
that it should be the subject of the detailed consideration mandated by 
NEPA; the activities of federal agencies cannot be isolated from their 
impact upon the. environment.191 
Thus, for the court, there is but one test, which provides that any 
significant impact on the environment will trigger NEPA coverage 
and create obligations for the federal actor. 
Many courts have adopted the double test, however. In a leading 
case, Hanly v. Kleindienst,te2 which was twice decided by the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals, all parties conceded that a major 
federal activity was involved. te3 However, the court stated that: 
[W]e are faced with the fact that almost every major federal action, 
no matter how limited in scope, has some adverse effect on the human 
environment. It is equally clear that an action which is environmentally 
important to one neighborhood may be of no consequence to another. 
Congress could have decided that every major federal action must there-
fore be the subject of a detailed impact statement. . . By adding the 
word "significantly," however, it demonstrated that before the agency 
in charge triggered that procedure, it should conclude that a greater 
environmental impact would result than from "any major federal ac-
tion."194 
The court proposed two factors to be considered in determining 
if a significant effect will occur: 
(1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental 
effects in excess of those created by existing uses in the area affected 
by it, and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects 
of the action itself, including the cumulative harm that results from its 
contribution to existing adverse conditions or uses in the affected area. 195 
Under this multi-faceted test, it would be possible for a major action 
to occur which does not trigger NEPA procedures, either because it 
has no great quantitative environmental effect or does not create 
adverse effects greater than other activities in the area. 
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As applied to the facts of its case, the court held that constructing 
a nine-story federal office building would not require an EIS, since 
the building would be located in an area already occupied by other, 
similar buildings. 1Ba However, the court observed that its twin build-
ing, which would house a jail, might require an EIS because of the 
potential impact of the jail on the neighborhood crime rate and 
various other social and psychological factors.1B7 
A third attempt to divine the statutory threshold, also utilizing a 
two-part analysis, was made in Citizens Organized to Defend the 
Environment (CODE) v. Volpe. us The court separated "major" 
from "significant" by stating that a "major federal action" is one 
that requires substantial planning, time, resources or expenditure.1BB 
On the other hand, 
A federal action "significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment" is one that has an important or meaningful effect, directly 
or indirectly, upon any of the many facets of man's environment. [cite 
omitted] The phrase must be broadly construed to give effect to the 
purposes of NEPA. A ripple begun in one small comer of an environ-
ment may become a wave threatening the quality of the total environ-
ment. Although the thread may appear fragile, if the actual environ-
mental impact is significant, it must be considered. 200 
Since these definitions are amorphous, it will be useful, in an 
attempt to demarcate the line at which NEPA's EIS requirement 
comes into play, to analyze the cases in which a "major action 
significantly affecting the environment" was found not to exist. In 
CODE v. Volpe,201 the court held that the transportation of coal 
strip mining equipment upon an Interstate highway was not a major 
action significantly affecting the environment, because no damage 
would occur to the highway and the contractual right to move the 
equipment was created long before the passage of NEPA. 
In Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe,202 a federal court found that the 
decision to allow a larger version of the Boeing 727 jet to provide 
service from Washington National Airport was not a major federal 
action significantly affecting the environment. The jet, though 
carrying more passengers, was "quieter, safer and rarely if ever 
loaded to a gross maximum weight greater than that of the [plane 
it replaced]. "203 
In Kisner v. Butz,204 the court ruled that construction of a 4.3 mile 
segment of a one-lane gravel road in a national forest was not a 
major federal action. The proposed road would have connected two 
30-year-old segments of road and would have added only 4.3 miles 
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of road to over 700 miles of roads already existing in the national 
forest.205 
In another road case,208 a court found no major action where a road 
merely was being widened to eliminate a bottleneck; only small 
parcels of land were being acquired for the right-of-way and less 
than $300,000 of federal money was to be expended on the project. 
The court treated major federal action as distinct from an action 
significantly affecting the environment, but found neither element 
in the project.207 
Three cases concerning housing developments found no major 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 
In Hiram Clark Civic Club v. Lynn,208 a HUD insurance guarantee 
for a low and moderate income housing development was found not 
to come under this section of NEPA because no adverse environ-
mental impact had been found in HUD's review of the project. The 
court did criticize HUD for claiming that only adverse environmen-
tal effects would require an EIS, but affirmed the District Court's 
factual determination that no EIS was required.209 In Wilson v. 
Lynn,210 the court again divided the issue into the "major" and 
"significant" components. The court found the project to be a major 
one, but found that since the project was a rehabilitation project 
retaining the exterior of existing buildings, there was no significant 
effect on the environment.211 
In Groton v. Laird,212 the third housing case, a similar two-part 
analysis was used. Again a major project, Navy housing, was held 
not to meet the significance test. The court seems to have seriously 
misunderstood the concerns and requirements of NEPA. It con-
cluded that the Navy housing project would have no significant 
impact because the town had expected housing to be built in the 
location selected.213 In addition, the court reasoned that "people 
have to have somewhere to live. There is no question that Groton 
has a serious housing shortage."214 The fact that an environmental 
impact may be caused by a non-federal source if the federal agency 
doesn't act, or that there exists a need for a federal project, defi-
nitely should not eliminate the requirement for an EIS. 
A few additional cases have based their conclusion of no major 
significant action on the theory that only adverse environmental 
effects would be considered significant and major.215 While other 
grounds might be found for finding no major significant action in 
these cases, they can all be criticized for looking solely for adverse 
effects in dealing with the threshold question. 
A final interesting case to consider is First National Bank of 
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Homestead v. Watson. 218 In Watson, plaintiff claimed that a major 
significant action occurred when the Comptroller of the Currency 
granted a license for a new federal bank in South Dade County, 
Florida, since the bank would probably finance new development 
which would have an adverse impact on the environment. While 
agreeing that the action was major, the court held that the impact 
of a new bank on the development process was too speculative and 
remote to constitute an environmentally significant action.217 
c) The quality of the human environment. 
As previously mentioned, the statutory requirement is that there 
be a "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment." A few cases have addressed the question of 
what is meant by the "quality of human environment." In MPIRG 
v. Butz,218 one defense offered was that there would be an impact 
on a wild area, but none on the human environment.219 The court, 
in rejecting this defense, replied: 
We think NEPA is concerned with indirect effects as well as direct 
effects. There has been increasing recognition that man and all other life 
on this earth may be significantly affected by actions which on the 
surface appear insignificant. . . . Apart from what may be referred to 
as "existence value," the evidence indicated that there are direct effects 
on the human environment from logging. Logging causes excess nutrient 
run-off which causes algal growth in the lakes and streams, affecting 
water purity. Logging roads may cause erosion and water pollution and 
remain visible for as long as 100 years; this affects the rustic, natural 
beauty of the [Boundary Waters Canoe Area], recognized as unique by 
the Forest Service itself. Logging destroys virgin forest, not only for 
recreational use, but for scientific and educational purposes as well. All 
these are significant impacts on the human environment. [emphasis in 
original]220 
With such an expansive definition, any effect on any remote area 
can be considered an effect on the human environment and poten-
tially within the purview of NEPA's EIS requirement. 
Three other cases deal with the question of what elements might 
be included within the meaning of human environment beyond the 
"normal" ecological ones. In Hanly v. Kleindienst,221 the court rec-
ognized that factors affecting the human environment encompassed 
more than air, water and noise pollution. It required the agency 
. . . to give attention to other factors that might affect human environ-
ment in the area, including the possibility of riots and disturbances in 
the jail which might expose neighbors to additional noise, the dangers 
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of crime to which neighbors might be exposed as a consequence of hous-
ing an out-patient treatment center in the building, possible traffic and 
parking problems . . . 222 
The Court then quoted their previous decision in this case: 
The Act must be construed to include protection of the quality of life 
for city residents. Noise, traffic, overburdened mass transportation sys-
tems, crime, congestion and even the availability of drugs all affect the 
urban "environment" and are surely results of the profound influences 
of ... high-density urbanization [and] industrial expansion.223 
The court expressed reservations about whether psychological or 
sociological factors should be included in the statutory concept of 
the human environment. 224 Nevertheless, it proceeded to consider as 
part of the environment the increase of the risk of crime and safety 
problems in the neighborhood which would result from construction 
of a drug treatment center, even though the nature of such consider-
ations is primarily psychological and sociological. 225 
In Tierrasanta Community Council u. Richardson,228 the court 
went further in finding that the location of a youth prison facility 
next to a school site would require an EIS. The court stated: 
The third assessment [which found that no EIS was necessary] did 
not adequately consider the psychological and sociological effects of the 
proposed youth facility on the families residing in the community ad-
joining the proposed facility, surrounding property values, the character 
of the adjoining residential neighborhood, or the education of elemen-
tary school children attending a school adjacent to the facility.227 
Thus, these two cases seem to broaden the definition of a human 
environment to include all factors one could describe as of concern 
to people. 
However, Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners (NO-CHA) u. Lynn,228 
sharply departs from this approach. In NO-CHA plaintiffs opposed 
a federal housing project on the ground that 
. . . the social characteristics of the prospective tenants of the housing 
units will have an adverse impact on the quality of the environment. . . 
[T]he plaintiffs allege that they are members of the "middle class 
and/or working class" which emphasizes obedience and respect for law-
ful authority, has a much lower propensity towards criminal behavior 
and acts of physical violence, and possesses a high regard for the physi-
cal and aesthetic improvement of real and personal property. The plain-
tiffs further allege that, as a "statistical whole" tenants of public hous-
ing possess a higher propensity toward criminal behavior and acts of 
physical violence, a disregard for the physical and aesthetic mainte-
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nance of real and personal property, and a lower commitment to hard 
work. Therefore, so the plaintiffs insist, the construction of public hous-
ing will increase the hazards of criminal acts, physical violence, and 
aesthetic and economic decline in the immediate vicinity of the sites. 
The plaintiffs maintain that these factors will have a direct adverse 
impact upon the physical safety of the plaintiffs residing in close prox-
imity to the sites, together with direct adverse impact upon the aes-
thetic and economic quality of their lives. 229 
In the face of this claim, the court decided the relevance of such 
factors to NEPA: 
At the outset, it must be noted that although human beings may be 
polluters (i.e., may create pollution), they are not themselves pollution 
(i.e., constitute pollution). Environmental impact in the meaning of the 
Act cannot be reasomibly construed to include a class of persons per se. 
The provisions of the Act concern actions which harm or affect the 
environment. Therefore, the social and economic characteristics of the 
potential occupants of public housing as such, are not decisive in deter-
mining whether an impact statement is required under the Act.230 
The court appeared hostile to plaintiff's attempt to transform 
NEPA's procedural requirements into a tool serving purposes akin 
to those of exclusionary zoning. 
2. The timing of the EIS and environmental evaluation under 
NEPA 
The CEQ guidelines are not very explicit concerning the timing 
for preparation of an EIS, since they merely call for the environmen-
tal review process to begin as "early as possible and in all cases prior 
to agency decision ... "231 However, the basic policy of NEPA and 
the guidelines is clear: 
Inasmuch as the environmental impact statement was intended to act 
as a tool in the decision-making process, preparation of such a statement 
should be completed prior to a final decision to proceed with any given 
project. Moreover, the statement ideally should be available early 
enough in the planning of a project so that it can be used to explore 
alternatives, including the alternative of abandoning the project alto-
gether.232 
Although this general policy is clear, it can be extremely difficult 
to apply to many kinds of activities of federal agencies, especially 
where portions of these activities have been initiated prior to the 
passage ofNEPA.233 Some general principles have emerged from the 
cases which are applicable to all activities; others can be analyzed 
according to the specific kind of federal activity involved. 
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a) Timing of an EIS for projects begun after the passage of NEPA. 
While courts have faced many problems involving complex pro-
jects and activities of various kinds, it will be useful to begin this 
analysis with the simplest case: a single-stage project which was 
conceived, planned, and is to be carried out after the passage of 
NEPA. Unfortunately, no such project has been the subject of a 
definitive court decision. Nevertheless, it is possible to construct the 
timetable which should be followed for such a hypothetical project. 
When a project is a mere idea or possibility, no preparatory work 
concerning the likely environmental impact is required.234 The time 
would be too early; the likely analysis too remote. However, when 
serious consideration of any course of action begins, that considera-
tion must include environmental factors: "Once a project has 
reached a coherent stage of development, it requires an environmen-
tal impact study. The comprehensive review contemplated by the 
Act can only be efficacious if undertaken as early as possible."235 
The environmental review must include all aspects required for the 
final EIS236 and must proceed simultaneously with any other 
analyses undertaken. 237 
By the time serious consideration of the project is underway and 
physical characteristics are being considered, a draft EIS must be 
made part of the decision-making record and the factors involved 
therein must be taken into account by decision-makers. 238 The draft 
EIS must be circulated for comment to CEQ, EPA, other relevant 
federal, state and local agencies, and the public.239 Adverse com-
ments elicited through this process must be responded to by the 
acting agency. 240 Both the comments elicited and the responses 
thereto must be included in the final EIS, which, in turn, must be 
considered by the agency decision-makers prior to their final deter-
mination to act.241 
b) Timing of an EIS for projects begun prior to the passage of 
NEPA. 
Many cases dealing with timing problems involved projects begun 
before NEPA's passage. Obviously, in these cases, no EIS could 
have been produced at the start of the project. However, environ-
mental considerations and analyses, and EIS's, are later required 
for such projects unless they are so close to completion that no 
purpose could be served by enforcing such requirements.242 
One of the most thorough and carefully considered cases analyz-
ing the application of NEPA's EIS requirement to projects begun 
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prior to the passage of NEPA is Sierra Club v. Froehlke,243 which 
concerns the Trinity River development program in Texas. The 
Trinity River program originated as a navigation enhancement pro-
ject begun with federal assistance around the time of the Civil War, 
and has been discussed, planned, acted upon, abandoned and resur-
rected with some frequency during the twentieth century. 244 The 
specific question facing the court in this instance was whether one 
of the project's dams, the Wallisville, (for which an EIS had been 
prepared) could continue under construction, or whether it was such 
an integral part of the overall project that it could be enjoined 
pending preparation of an EIS for the overall project on the ground 
that NEPA applied to the overall project. At the time of the suit, 
the Wallisville Dam was approximately 87% complete, but repre-
sented only 2% of the total estimated $1.4 billion cost for the entire 
project. 245 
The court found that the entire project required an EIS, and 
enjoined further construction on the Wallisville segment.248 First the 
court considered the question whether applying the requirements of 
NEPA to either the entire Trinity project, or the Wallisville Dam 
by itself, would create an impermissible retroactive application of 
the Act. It observed that "a majority of the better reasoned cases 
have generally held NEPA applicable to ongoing projects, using a 
variety of tests."247 Indeed, "[t]he guidelines of the Council on 
Environmental Quality would favor applying NEPA in full except 
in instances in which it is not practicable to reassess the basic course 
of action."248 
Even where the basic course of action is set, major increments of 
additional activities would still be subject to NEPA requirements. 
The court stated that "a presumption in favor of NEPA's applica-
tion is proper, particularly where substantial action is yet to be 
taken, absent equally persuasive contradicting factors."24D 
Applying its analysis to the Trinity project, the court decided that 
the entire project clearly was subject to NEPA requirements, even 
though planning had occurred over a long period before NEPA's 
enactment and the Wallisville Dam was virtually complete.25o 
The decision of the District Court to enjoin construction of the 
Wallisville Dam was reversed by the Fifth Circuit in Sierra Club v. 
Callaway.251 However, Circuit Judge Grooms, author of the court's 
opinion, did not disapprove the application of NEPA to either the 
Wallisville Dam or the Trinity project. Rather, he found that the 
Wallisville Dam was a separate project, with independent validity, 
a distinct history, and separate funding, and hence should not be 
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enjoined because of the need for an overall EIS for the Trinity pro-
ject. The court determined that there was already an acceptable 
EIS for the Wallisville Dam and that a program EIS for the Trinity 
project was in preparation.252 
A second major decision applying the requirements of NEPA to 
a project begun prior to its passage is Arlington Coalition v. Volpe,253 
which involved an interstate highway segment in Virginia. The con-
struction of the highway had been approved in 1959,254 and state 
acquisition of the land needed for the road had begun in 1966.255 At 
the time of decision, substantial work on the project had already 
been completed: "in the proposed corridor, 93.9 percent of all dwell-
ings have been acquired; 98.5 percent of all businesses have been 
acquired; 75.6 percent of all families have been relocated; 84.6 per-
cent of all businesses have been relocated; and 84.4 percent of all 
necessary right-of-way has been acquired."258 However, actual con-
struction had barely begun; preliminary work on one approach and 
one culvert were the only physical activities.257 The court enjoined 
all further activities on the highway project until an EIS was 
drafted, finding that the project was ongoing after the effective date 
of NEPA, and reasoning that: 
Doubtless Congress did not intend that all projects ongoing at the 
effective date of the Act be subject to the requirements of Section 102. 
At some stage of progress, the cost of altering or abandoning the project 
could so definitely outweigh whatever benefits that might accrue there-
from that it might no longer be "possible" to change the project in 
accordance with Section 102. At some stage, federal action may be so 
"complete" that applying the Act could be considered a "retroactive" 
application not intended by Congress. The congressional command that 
the Act be complied with "to the fullest extent possible" means, we 
believe, that an ongoing project was intended to be subject to Section 
102 until it has reached that stage of completion, and that doubt about 
whether the critical stage has been reached must be resolved in favor of 
applicability.258 
However, the key factor for the court was the fact that further 
federal decision points still existed, and that actual construction 
was not underway: 
We cannot, of course, define for all cases the point of completion 
beyond which section 102(C) [sic] is no longer applicable. We are cer-
tain, however, that Arlington 1-66 has not yet reached that point: 
P.S.&E. approval has not yet been given, construction contracts have 
not been awarded, and actual construction on the highway itself has not 
begun.259 
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Not all courts have agreed that projects begun prior to the effec-
tive date of NEPA should be required to comply with its require-
ments. In Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett , 280 plain-
tiffs claimed that NEPA applied to a highway relocation project 
approved by the Department of Transportation in 1969. Construc-
tion of the project began in 1970, and was completed before the 
Circuit Court decision was announced.281 The court held NEPA in-
applicable, because 
For all practical purposes,. . . final federal action on the project took 
place prior to January 1, 1970, the effective date of NEPA ... This is 
not a case where discretionary federal administrative action takes place 
in stages, and some stages have taken place prior to January 1, 1970 
while others remain.282 
However, Bartlett and similar cases283 seem to reflect the principle 
that only a nearly completed project will be allowed to proceed 
without an EIS being prepared. An EIS will be required for parts of 
the project which are not yet under actual construction. 
The question of applicability to pre-NEPA projects will diminish 
as virtually all such projects are completed or divided into pre- and 
post-NEPA segments, with compliance required for the latter. 
c) Timing of EIS's for research programs. 
A landmark case, Scientists' Institute v. Atomic Energy 
Commission,284 recognized that the AEC was obligated to prepare an 
EIS for the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program (LMFBR 
Program). The LMFBR Program is a long-range, expensive and 
controversial research program designed to develop a new source of 
electricity for the U.S. It began in the early 1950's with the construc-
tion of experimental breeder reactors, and has been continued ever 
since.285 The AEC estimated that the total cost to the federal govern-
ment for development of the reactors would exceed two billion dol-
lars.288 
The court was presented with two issues for determination: 
whether the AEC was required to prepare an EIS for the overall 
research program, and when such a program EIS, if required, should 
be prepared. 
The court found that the research activities constituted a major 
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment, and thus required a general program impact statement. 
We think it plain that at some point in time there should be a detailed 
statement on the overall LMFBR program. The program comes before 
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the Congress as a "proposal for legislation" each year, in the form of 
appropriations requests by the Commission. And as the Council on En-
vironmental Quality has noted in its NEPA Guidelines, the statutory 
phrase "recommendation or report on proposals for legislation" includes 
"[r]ecommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation includ-
ing that for appropriations." In addition, the program constitutes 
"major Federal action" within the meaning of the statute.267 
Further, the court explained the need for an EIS in terms of the 
objectives of NEPA: 
NEPA's objective of controlling the impact of technology on the envi-
ronment cannot be served by all practicable means . . . unless the 
statute's action forcing impact statement process is applied to ongoing 
federal agency programs aimed at developing new technologies which, 
when applied, will affect the environment. To wait until a technology 
attains the stage of complete commercial feasibility before considering 
the possible adverse environmental effects attendant upon ultimate 
application of the technology will undoubtedly frustrate meaningful 
consideration and balancing of environmental costs against economic 
and other benefits. Modem technological advances typically stem from 
massive investments in research and development, as is the case here. 
Technological advances are therefore capital investments and, as stich, 
once brought to a stage of commercial feasibility the investment in their 
development acts to compel their application. Once there has been, in 
the terms of NEPA, "an irretrievable commitment of resources" in the 
technology development stage, the balance of environmental costs and 
economic and other benefits shifts in favor of ultimate application of the 
technology.268 
The court found that an EIS should be immediately drafted, be-
cause of the need for "meaningful, timely information on the effects 
of agency action."289 The court considered the problems raised by 
drafting an EIS either too early or too late in the development 
process: 
In the early stages of research, when little is known about the technol-
ogy and when future application of the technology is both doubtful and 
remote, it may well be impossible to draft a meaningful impact state-
ment. Predictions as to the possible effects of application of the technol-
ogy would tend toward uninformative generalities, arrived at by guess-
work rather than analysis. NEPA requires predictions, but not proph-
ecy, and impact statements ought not to be modeled upon the works of 
Jules Verne or H.G. Wells. At the other end ofthe spectrum, by the time 
commercial feasibility of the technology is conclusively demonstrated, 
and the effects of application of the technology certain, the purposes of 
NEPA will already have been thwarted. Substantial investments will 
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have been made in development of the technology and options will have 
been precluded without consideration of environmental factors. Any 
statement prepared at such a late date will no doubt be thorough, de-
tailed and accurate, but it will be of little help in ensuring that decisions 
reflect environmental concerns. Thus we are pulled in two directions. 
Statements must be written late enough in the development process to 
contain meaningful information, but they must be written early enough 
so that whatever information is contained can practically serve as an 
input into the decision making process. 270 
In reconciling these competing concerns with regard to the appro-
priate timing of EIS preparation and in deciding that an EIS should 
be prepared immediately, the court enumerated several factors that 
entered its consideration: 
Some balance must be struck, and several factors should be weighed in 
the balance. How likely is the technology to prove commercially feasi-
ble, and how soon will that occur? To what extent is meaningful infor-
mation presently available on the effects of application of the technol-
ogy and of alternatives and their effects? To what extent are irretrieva-
ble commitments being made and options precluded as the development 
program progresses? How severe will be the environmental effects if the 
technology does prove commercially feasible? 
Answers to questions like these require agency expertise, and there-
fore the initial and primary responsibility for striking a balance between 
the competing concerns must rest with the agency itself, not with the 
courts. At the same time, however, some degree of judicial scrutiny of 
an agency's decision that the time is not yet ripe for a NEPA statement 
is necessary in order to ensure that the policies of the Act are not being 
frustrated or ignored. Agency decisions in the environmental area touch 
on fundamental personal interests in life and health, and these interests 
have always had a special claim to judicial protection. 271 
The court recognized that this balancing process is a difficult one, 
and when controversial programs are involved, likely to generate 
substantial differences of opinion. It therefore directed that a record 
be created to show the reasoning and justifications for an agency 
determination that the time was not yet ripe for drafting as EIS: 
[W]hen the agency has decided that a NEPA statement is not yet 
necessary, it should state reasons for its decision. The value of such a 
statement of reasons is becoming generally recognized as courts and 
agencies grapple with the difficult task of developing procedures for 
compliance with NEPA .... A statement of reasons will serve two 
functions. It will ensure that the agency has given adequateconsidera-
tion to the problem and that it understood the statutory standard. In 
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addition, it will provide a focal point for judicial review of the agency's 
decision, giving the court the benefit of the agency's expertise.272 
The court noted that the requirement for an overall program EIS 
does not eliminate the need for a specific EIS for each individual 
project undertaken as part of the development program.273 
3. Negative statements 
A purely administrative- and judge-created aspect of NEPA pro-
cedure is the negative statement, a formal document prepared to 
justify a decision not to prepare an EIS for a given project.274 As 
previously mentioned, the decision to prepare an EIS is triggered by 
an agency finding that a project involves major federal action which 
will significantly affect the quality of the human environment.275 
This threshold determination has been recognized by courts as a key 
one, since a decision not to prepare an EIS eliminates a significant 
amount of environmental consideration by the agency, as well as 
input from other federal and state agencies and the public in the 
decision process.276 
As a result, the burden has been placed on agencies to establish 
that any decision not to prepare an EIS is a reasonable one, and not 
an attempt to avoid the standards of NEPA. To do this, the "assess-
ment statement must provide convincing reasons why a construc-
tion project with 'arguably' potentially significant environmental 
impact does not require a detailed impact statement."277 
The courts will look at several factors in deciding to accept or 
reject an environmental assessment and a decision based on it not 
to prepare an EIS. 
First, did the agency take a "hard look" at the problem, as opposed 
to bald conclusions, unaided by preliminary investigation? .. Second, 
did the agency identify the relevant area of environmental concern? .. 
Third, as to problems studied and identified, does the agency make a 
convincing case that the impact is insignificant? ... the fourth crite-
rion: If there is impact of true "significance" has the agency convinc-
ingly established that changes in the project have sufficiently mini-
mized it?278 
One of the leading cases concerning the negative declaration re-
quirement is Hanly v. Mitchell279 and its successor opinion, Hanly 
v. Kleindienst. 28o In that case, the General Services Administration 
originally prepared a one-page memorandum finding that location 
of a proposed new federal jail in downtown Manhattan had no envi-
ronmental impact.281 The court in Hanly v. Mitchell ordered a more 
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detailed assessment of environmental impact and stated that GSA 
must "affirmatively develop a reviewable environmental record."282 
In its second decision, the court was faced with the issue of 
whether the environmental assessment could be prepared infor-
mally without the public input required for an EIS. It found that a 
certain degree of formality and public input was needed: 
We now go further and hold that before a preliminary or threshold 
determination of significance is made the responsible agency must give 
notice to the public of the proposed major federal action and an oppor-
tunity to submit relevant facts which might bear upon the agency's 
threshold decision. We do not suggest that a full-fledged formal hearing 
must be provided before each such determination is made, although it 
should be apparent that in many cases such a hearing would be advisa-
ble for reasons already indicated. The necessity for a hearing will depend 
greatly upon the circumstances surrounding the particular proposed 
action and upon the likelihood that a hearing will be more effective than 
other methods in developing relevant information and an understanding 
of the proposed action. The precise procedural steps to be adopted are 
better left to the agency, which should be in a better position than the 
court to determine whether solution of the problems faced with respect 
to a specific major federal action can better be achieved through a 
hearing or by informal acceptance of relevant data.283 
In addition to considering the need for public input, the court 
found it appropriate to make a detailed review of the environmental 
assessment. 284 Given the intensity of its review, it appears that the 
court treated the negative declaration almost as it would have 
treated an EIS. Indeed, in approving parts of the assessment made 
by GSA, the court noted that "the assessment closely parallels in 
form a detailed impact statement."285 
The requirement that the assessment virtually meet the stan-
dards of an EIS is echoed in Simmans v. Grant,288 where the court 
states: 
What is actually required under NEPA and these regulations [EPA 
Guidelines] is that the federal agency prepare a "mini" environmental 
impact statement . . . . Without such a record it is impossible for a 
district court to determine whether or not the agency has complied with 
sections l02(2)(A), (B) and (D) of NEPA (cites omitted).287 
According to the Simmans court, there is some benefit in saved 
time and effort to the agency drafting the negative declaration: 
The preparation of a negative declaration, with accompanying envi-
ronmental appraisal, saves the sponsoring agency time and expense 
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which would be required in the preparation of a formal impact state-
ment and also eliminates the necessity of preparing draft impact state-
ments to be circulated to the appropriate federal agencies and interested 
parties prior to its final completion.288 
Thus, it is clear that agencies must prepare an environmental 
assessment and negative declaration for each action which is found 
not to warrant preparation of an EIS. The declaration must set forth 
the reasoning upon which the agency's finding of no impact is based 
and must show appropriate consideration of all relevant environ-
mental consequences. 
B. Adequacy of the Environmental Impact Statement 
After the threshold questions have been affirmatively answered, 
the federal agency will face the need to draft an EIS. During this 
phase, the agency must ensure that the various required elements 
of the EIS are adequately and objectively covered. 289 
1. An EIS shall be prepared "by the responsible [federal] offi-
cial. " 
Courts have differed strongly over the issue of who must actually 
prepare environmental impact statements, both draft and final. It 
is clear from the statute and CEQ Guidelines that the federal 
agency involved in a project is responsible for the EIS.290 However, 
responsibility can be interpreted in various ways. At one extreme, 
the requirement can be interpreted to compel a federal agency, 
through its own employees, to conduct all research and information 
gathering necessary for the EIS, and to write every word of both the 
draft and final EIS. At the other extreme, one can argue that the 
responsibility of the federal agency is satisfied by mere approval of 
an EIS, with all re!,\earch and information gathering, and all writing, 
performed by a non-federal actor. The non-federal actor might be a 
state or local agency, private consultant hired for the specific pur-
pose of drafting the EIS, or even an interested party heavily in-
volved in the proposal under consideration. A wide range of middle 
grounds exists between these extremes. 
There are court decisions which adopt variants of both extremes, 
as well as middle positions. The decision which strongly adheres to 
the position that federal agencies must prepare the EIS and do a 
major part of the background work is Greene County Planning Com-
mission v. Federal Power Commission. 291 In Greene County the Fed-
eral Power Commission had licensed the construction of high vol-
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tage transmission lines by the Power Authority of the State of New 
York. In an attempt to comply with NEPA, FPC regulations re-
quired "each applicant for a license for a 'major project' to file its 
own detailed statement of environmental impact ... "292 
The FPC relied on that report as its own environmental state-
ment, and proceeded to hold hearings. The court determined that 
the procedure of using the statement of the state agency as the EIS 
was improper for two reasons: (1) the statement will be almost 
unavoidably self-serving, and (2) the failure of the federal agency 
itself to prepare an EIS which objectively considers environmental 
impacts will place the burden of protecting the environment on 
private intervenors with limited resources, if any exist: 
The Federal Power Commission had abdicated a significant part of 
its responsibility by substituting the statement of PASNY [the electric 
power company] for its own. The Commission appears to be content to 
collate the comments of other federal agencies, its own staff and the 
intervenors and once again to act as an umpire. The danger of this 
procedure, and one obvious shortcoming, is the potential, if not likeli-
hood, that the applicant's statement will be based upon self-serving 
assumptions .. . 
Moreover, ... , intervenors generally have limited resources, both in 
terms of money and technical expertise, and thus may not be able to 
provide an effective analysis of environmental factors. It was in part for 
this reason that Congress has compelled agencies to seek the aid of all 
available expertise and formulate their own position early in the review 
process.293 
The court did allow some private participation in the drafting 
process, by recommending as a model the procedure used by the 
Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC procedure required that an 
applicant prepare an environmental statement as part of its appli-
cation process. However, the AEC staff then would prepare its own 
draft EIS to be used at hearings and circulated to interested govern-
ment and private agencies. After the hearings, the AEC staff would 
draft the final EIS. 294 
Greene County is not alone in requiring the EIS to be drafted by 
the appropriate federal agency. In Conservation Society of Southern 
Vermont v. Secretary of Transportation,295 the Vermont Highway 
Department had prepared the draft and final EIS in accordance 
with the Department of Transportation's regulations. The regula-
tions required "cooperation" and "consultation" between the fed-
eral and state agencies, and provided that "[federal highway ad-
ministration] review and adoption of the final impact statement 
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shall be the responsiblity of the Regional Federal Highway Adminis-
trator."296 
The court found that an inherent danger of "self-serving assump-
tions" exists where the same state highway department which ini-
tially proposes a project is primarily responsible for assessing its 
environmental impact. In addition, it found that review of the EIS 
conducted by the federal agency in the instant case was "merely 
perfunctory, the equivalent of an agency rubber stamp."297 Such a 
perfunctory role in the consideration of environmental issues raised 
by the project is a clear violation of § 102(2)(C) of NEPA, which 
exists "to ensure that the federal agency making the decision con-
sider environmental values, potential alternatives and the overall 
consequences of the proposed action (original emphasis)."298 
Three other cases concerning highway construction, 1-291 Why?, 
Association v. Burns,299 Scheer v. Volpe,30o and Northside Tenants 
Association v. Volpe301 also disapprove the use of state environmen-
tal reports in lieu of a federal agency EIS. 
The majority of cases, however, distinguish Greene County and 
authorize procedures under which an EIS may be prepared by a 
non-federal party. Perhaps the most extreme of these cases is Life 
of the Land v. Brinegar,302 which concerned the construction of a 
new runway at Honolulu International Airport. While the Federal 
Aviation Administation was consulted during the drafting process, 
both the draft and final EIS were actually prepared by a private 
engineering firm with a vested interest in having the project ap-
proved.303 However, the court concluded that: "We find nothing, 
however, in either the wording of NEPA or the case law, which 
indicates that, as a matter of law, a firm with a financial interest 
in the project may not assist with the drafting of the EIS."304 
Rather, the court found that the key issue was whether there was 
"good faith objectivity" rather than "subjective impartiality" in the 
preparation of the EIS.305 It found that such objectivity was main-
tained by continuous federal agency involvement in the drafting 
process through regular consultation and active federal agency ex-
amination and review of the draft and final EIS's before their adop-
tion. The court asserted that there would be no abdication of re-
sponsibility or other undesirable consequences where such consul-
tation and review has occurred. 
Justice Douglas of the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently stayed 
approval of the runway project for federal funding but the stay was 
vacated by the full Court.306 In Justice Douglas' dissent to vacation 
of the stay, he attacked the delegation permitted by the court below: 
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"It seems to me a total frustration of the entire purpose of NEPA 
to entrust evaluation of the environmental factors to a firm with a 
multimillion dollar stake in the approval of the project."307 
While there was no majority opinion, it does seem that the vaca-
tion of the stay and subsequent denial of certiorari constitute Su-
preme Court willingness to allow the analysis of the Ninth Circuit 
to be followed by federal agencies which wish to do so. 
Taking a similar position is Florida Audubon Society v. 
CallawaY,308 which concerned the granting of an Army Corps of En-
gineers dredge and fill permit to allow construction of a nuclear 
facility at Jacksonville, Florida. Although the Army Corps of Engi-
neers drafted the EIS, the information used in the drafting came 
from the private developers, with the Corps of Engineers performing 
no independent investigations.30s The court, however, found that the 
Corps "independently examined the data and reached its own con-
clusion."310 In approving the procedure, which required mere read-
ing and analysis of the data submitted, the court stated: "The law 
is clear that the agency preparing the impact statement is permitted 
to accept data from interested parties so long as the analysis of the 
issues is prepared by the agency. "311 
A recent Fifth Circuit case dealt with the delegation problem in 
the context of a housing project which was to receive a HUn mort-
gage guarantee and interest subsidy. Sierra Club v. Lynn3\2 states 
that "the direct participation of the developer and his experts in the 
underlying environmental and other studies"313 does not automati-
cally render an EIS fatally deficient. The court offers the following 
analysis: 
There is no NEPA prohibition against a state agency, financially inter-
ested private contractor or new community applicant providing the fed-
eral agency, which must of necessity work closely with these parties, 
data, information, reports, groundwork environmental studies or other 
assistance in the preparation of an environmental impact statement 
[cites omitted]. NEPA demands only that "the applicable federal 
agency must bear the responsibility for the ultimate work product de-
signed to satisfy the requirement of §102(2)(C)" [cites omitted]. 
NEPA's commands, however, do not permit the responsible federal 
agency to abdicate its statutory duties by reflexively rubber stamping a 
statement prepared by others. The agency must independently perform 
its reviewing, analytical and judgmental functions and participate ac-
tively and significantly in the preparation and drafting process [cite 
omitted].314 
Virtually all other cases allowing delegation of responsibility for 
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preparing the EIS concern delegation to a state highway agency. 315 
In Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality v. Volpe,318 the court 
reviewed the many cases concerning preparation of the EIS by state 
highway commissions, and approved a procedure by which a state 
highway commission would write the draft EIS and final EIS, with 
federal officials reviewing and circulating the statements. The court 
ruled that "Review, modification and adoption by the FHWA 
[Federal Highway Administration] of a statement as its own oc-
cured in this case. Such extensive participation by the responsible 
federal agency would clearly distinguish this case from Greene 
County. "317 
Thus, most courts appear to be willing to accept at least state 
agency drafting of the EIS if the federal agency is involved by con-
sultation in the drafting process, and adopts the EIS as its own after 
critically examining its contents. It may also be possible, where an 
objective analysis occurs, and the federal agency is involved in the 
drafting process, for a private party to draft the EIS. Nevertheless, 
owing to the persuasive reasons for preserving maximum objectivity 
in impact statements, courts may continue to develop and impose 
judicial safeguards in this important area. 
2. "[TJo the fullest extent possible. . . a detailed statement. " 
The language of NEPA and the CEQ Guidelines requires that a 
"detailed" statement be written which sets forth, to the fullest ex-
tent possible, all the environmental considerations and information 
relevant to the proposal under consideration. 
One of the first cases decided under NEPA by an appellate court, 
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States At-
omic Energy Commission,318 concerned rulemaking by the AEC. 
Calvert Cliffs discusses the obligations created by NEPA and the 
expansive interpretation to be given these obligations. In the court's 
view, NEPA requires federal agencies to substantially modify their 
procedures to provide for a genuinely detailed analysis of environ-
mental considerations, since "NEPA ... makes environmental 
protection a part of the mandate of every federal agency and depart-
ment."319 
The court interpreted the statutory phrase "to the fullest extent 
possible" to create "a high standard for the agencies, a standard 
which must be rigorously enforced by the reviewing courts. "320 The 
standard, according to the decision, is one which requires "a partic-
ular sort of careful and informed decisionmaking process and cre-
ates judicially enforceable duties. "321 
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Compliance to the "fullest" possible extent would seem to demand 
that environmental issues be considered at every important stage in the 
decisionmaking process concerning a particular action-at every stage 
where an overall balancing of environmental and nonenvironmental fac-
tors is appropriate and where alterations might be made in the proposed 
action to minimize environmental costs. [original emphasis]322 
The decision recognizes that the detailed environmental explora-
tion and required statement will be expensive and time consuming. 
However, given the important goals and clear mandate of NEPA, 
such expense must necessarily be accepted and borne to advance 
the statute's goals. 
An excellent explanation of the meaning of the requirement that 
a statement be detailed can be found in Silva v. Lynn,323 which 
involved an insufficient EIS for a HUD-sponsored housing project. 
The court felt that the detailed statement serves three purposes: 
First, it permits the court to ascertain whether the agency has made 
a good faith effort to take into account the values NEPA seeks to safe-
guard. To that end it must "explicate fully its course of inquiry, its 
analysis and its reasoning." Second, it serves as an environmental full 
disclosure law, providing information which Congress thought the pub-
lic should have concerning the particular environmental costs involved 
in a project. To that end, it "must be written in language that is under-
standable to nontechnical minds and yet contain enough scientific rea-
soning to alert specialists to particular problems within the field of their 
expertise." It cannot be composed of statements "too vague, too general 
and too conclusory." Finally, and perhaps most substantively, the re-
quirement of a detailed statement helps insure the integrity of the pro-
cess of decision by precluding stubborn problems or serious criticism 
from being swept under the rug. A conclusory statement 'unsupported 
by empirical or experimental data, scientific authorities, or explanatory 
information of any kind' not only fails to crystallize issues, but 'affords 
no basis for a comparison of the problems involved with the proposed 
project and the difficulties involved in the alternatives.' [cites omit-
ted] 324 
Thus the detailed statement is required to provide the informa-
tion which should be available to decision-makers and those who 
wish to review or dispute the decision. It must reproduce the 
decision-making process so others can check the legitimacy of the 
process. The statement must also point out the unsolved problems, 
and areas of controversy and difficult choice, to enable a decision-
maker to fully understand the project under consideration. 
The court in Silva found that the goals were not met by a simple 
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"four line description" of how HUD would alleviate a major flooding 
problem at the prospective site. Conclusory statements, with no real 
explanation of the actual proposed solution or of other controversial 
parts of the project, compelled the court to find the EIS insufficient. 
The question of what information is required to produce a satis-
factory EIS was also considered in Environmental Defense Fund, 
Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,325 which concerned the then two-thirds 
complete Gillham Dam Project on the Cossatot River in Arkansas. 
The court found that: 
At the very least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure law. . . . 
The detailed statement. . . should, at a minimum, contain such infor-
mation as will alert the President, the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity, the public, and, indeed, the Congress, to all known possible environ-
mental consequences of proposed agency action. [original emphasis)326 
The court also indicated the extent to which information and 
opinions submitted to the government agency by outside parties 
should be included in the EIS. In the interest of full disclosure and 
analysis, the court felt that all such information should be included: 
Where experts, or concerned public or private organizations, or even 
ordinary lay citizens, bring to the attention of the responsible agency 
environment impacts which they contend will result from the proposed 
agency action, then the § 102 statement should set forth these conten-
tions and opinions, even if the responsible agency finds no merit in them 
whatsoever. 327 
The EIS also must contain agency comments on and evaluations of 
such information and opinions.328 
The court applies the detailed statement requirement by examin-
ing the adequacy of the information included, showing the gaps in 
the information, and even went behind the statement by evaluating 
the studies upon which the conclusions in the EIS were based.328 
Courts have realized that the detailed statement which is re-
quired could be so difficult to draft that no project would ever be 
approved. As a result, decisions have accepted EIS's which do not 
explore all issues in the detail that long-term studies might provide. 
In Sierra Club v. Froehlke,330 dealing with a flood control dam in 
Wisconsin, the court recognized this problem and accepted as valid 
the claim that NEPA " ... does not require that every conceivable 
study be performed and that each problem be documented from 
every angle to explore its every potential for good or ill. Rather, what 
is required is that officials and agencies take a 'hard look' at envi-
ronmental consequences" [cite omitted]. 331 
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Further, the court adopted the language of Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Corps of Engineers: 332 
[I]t is doubtful that any agency, however objective, however sincere, 
however well-staffed, and however well-financed could come up with a 
perfect environmental impact statement in connection with any major 
project. Further studies, evaluations and analyses by experts are almost 
certain to reveal inadequacies or deficiencies.333 
However, the court cautioned that the EIS did require a detailed 
analysis and that an EIS must "objectively and comprehensively 
[consider] the environmental consequences of the proposed pro-
ject. "334 
Brooks v. Volpe335 is a good example of the failure of an agency to 
meet the statutory minimum. Brooks concerned the adequacy of a 
43-page EIS for a segment of the Interstate Highway system. The 
court found that: 
For the most part, the impact statement suffers from a serious lack 
of detail, and relies on conclusions and assumptions without reference 
to supporting objective data. Federal reviewers could not have made an 
independent decision based on the information referred to, because the 
sources are not disclosed. 
The impact statement also suffers from a reliance on generalities and 
heavy-handed self-justifications. 338 
The court required that additional studies be undertaken to de-
termine the environmental impact of the highway segment. How-
ever, it was concerned, as were the courts in the cases discussed 
above, that the task of the federal agency not be made impossible: 
[I]f the court were to rule that defendants [the agency] must per-
form all possible research in the environmental effects of the highway, 
the project could be postponed indefinitely, perhaps forever. Emotional 
environmentalism must be tempered with rational realism. Litigants 
must not be allowed to use NEPA as a tool to destroy federal programs 
under the guise of interest in the environment.337 
Thus the statutory phrases "to the fullest extent possible" and 
"detailed statement" include both a requirement of a substantial, 
good faith effort at studying, analyzing and expressing the environ-
mental issues in the EIS and the decision-making process, and a 
recognition that a rule of reason must prevail because an EIS which 
fully explores every relevant environmental detail could never be 
drafted. 
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3. "[TJhe environmental impact of the proposed action" 
NEPA requires the detailed statement to analyze "the environ-
mental impact of the proposed action." The CEQ Guidelines ex-
plain that this requirement compels federal agencies to include a 
description of the proposed action, a description of the environment 
affected, both as it is and as it will be after the action is taken, an 
analysis of the proposal's population and growth impacts, and an 
examination of the relationship between the proposed action and 
land use control activities in the affected area.338 
Several cases have considered the adequacy of the discussions of 
environmental impact. In Montgomery v. Ellis,339 concerning a 
stream channelization project in Alabama, the description of the 
proposed project was found to be inadequate. The court held 
that in order to draft an adequate EIS, it was essential that there 
be a full and clear description of the proposed project sufficient to 
allow any interested person to know what the proposal is. "Without 
such basic information, the EIS must be deemed insufficient on its 
face."34o 
The court in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of 
Engineers341 discussed the description of the environment which 
must be included in the statement. The court accepted the claim 
of plaintiffs that "the impact statement simply does not set forth a 
detailed study and examination of the important environmental 
factors involved."342 A sufficient EIS, the court felt, should describe 
among other things the present physical condition of the area. More 
specifically, the EIS should describe the species of animals and 
plants living in the area, the food chains existing in the area, and 
similar considerations, as well as determine whether there are "key-
stone" species in the affected area the removal of which could trig-
ger a chain of events which will dramatically change the ecological 
balance of the whole area.343 In addition, the EIS must predict what 
the impact of the activity is likely to be on the present condition of 
the area. 
In Lathan v. Volpe,3U the court considered the adequacy of the 
impact description in an EIS for an interstate highway segment. 
The court found the description to be faulty because it 
inadequately describe[ d] the detrimental effects of air pollution on 
people (e.g. residents and drivers) in the vicinity of the corridor, 
fail[ed] to back up its conclusions on noise pollution with scientific 
data or reference to specific studies, and neglect[ ed] to consider in 
detail the long-term effects of such a major highway on land use and 
population distribution in the metropolitan Seattle area.345 
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In addition, the EIS lacked information about the impact of a tun-
nel on houses in the area, highway congestion problems likely to 
occur on other roads, and similar environmental effects to be caused 
by the project.348 
Another court found it necessary to conduct its own detailed anal-
ysis of environmental impact in order to assess the adequacy of an 
EIS prepared with regard to the proposed Trinity River project in 
Texas.347 After making such an independent environmental analy-
sis, the court in Sierra Club v. Froehlke found the EIS to be inade-
quate. Given the complexity of the project, the court felt that the 
Corps of Engineers should have included detailed information con-
cerning archeological sites to be affected by the project together 
with predictions concerning whether the sites would be harmed. The 
impact of the project on water quality, wildlife and fish, the estuary 
and related matters, including predictions of injury, all had to be 
included in the EIS for it to adequately express the impact of the 
project.348 
The environmental impact analysis should include, moreover, an 
analysis of population and growth characteristics and the project's 
impact on land use control activities. The court in Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,349 while criticizing the use of 
an EIS as a "bootstrap" to justify a project, praised the Corps' 
oberservation that 
[a]fter the construction of the dam, ... there will be increased eco-
nomic and industrial development, with resulting population growth 
... This growth and development will, based on past experience, result 
in the pollution of the river in the future. Therefore, the dam is designed 
to store a certain quantity of water which may later be released to dilute 
the pollution and thereby enhance the water quality.3DO 
Likewise, in Sierra Club v. Froehlke,351 one of the reasons given for 
the finding of inadequacy was that the Corps of Engineers failed to 
consider the "development, growth, and industrial expansion" 
which would result from the project. 
Thus the court decisions indicate that the statutory phrase "the 
environmental impact of the proposed action" is to be interpreted 
liberally to require that the EIS discuss in detail the proposed pro-
ject, the environment of the location (defining environment in the 
broadest sense), and the likely future secondary effects of the pro-
ject on population, growth and development as well as direct effects 
on the environment. 
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4. "Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be implemented" 
The CEQ Guidelines explain that these effects should be con-
strued to include, for example, "undesirable land use patterns, 
damage to life systems, urban congestion, threats to health or other 
consequences adverse to the environmental goals"352 set out in 
NEP A. The EIS section discussing this topic should also specify 
"for purposes of contrast" avoidable adverse effects and how they 
are to be avoided.353 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant,3S4 which concerned 
a stream channelization project in North Carolina, considered the 
required statement of adverse effects on the environment. As with 
other information required by NEPA, information on adverse effects 
must be detailed and clear, enabling the decision-makers and re-
viewers to know exactly what the adverse effects will be to the 
extent that they are or can be known. Accordingly, the court re-
jected a section of the EIS concerning sediment deposits because the 
section predicted a specified amount of sediment without discussing 
the downstream effects of the sediment: 
Having conceded a massive increase in sedimentation, the Statement 
disposes of its environmental effects in one conclusory statement unsup-
ported by empirical or experimental data, scientific authorities, or ex-
planatory information of any kind. Where there is no reference to scien-
tific or objective data to support conclusory statements, NEPA's full 
disclosure requirements have not been honored.355 
One may therefore conclude that the statement must discuss not 
only direct effects of the project, but also cumulative effects of the 
project itself over time and effects of the project when considered 
in combination with other federal projects in the same area.358 
According to some courts, the federal agency must go beyond 
explaining the adverse effects and discuss mitigation of them. One 
court has observed that: "NEPA states indirectly, but affirma-
tively, that under some circumstances federal agencies must miti-
gate some and possibly all of the environmental impacts arising 
from a proposed project."357 According to another court, "all adverse 
environmental effects should be listed, and harmful effects which 
cannot be avoided must be discussed to indicate what measures can 
be taken to minimize the harm. "358 
In sum, under the detailed discussion requirement, adverse ef-
fects must be separately discussed and analyzed in the EIS. How-
ever, such mitigation efforts may also be discussed as alternatives 
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to the action and so sometimes will not appear in this section of an 
EIS. 
5. "Alternatives to the proposed action" 
A key part of the EIS is the discussion of alternatives, since the 
major policy decisions and controversial aspects of a project are 
most clearly brought into focus by a detailed statement of other 
possible means of carrying out the goals of the proposed project. 
According to the Guidelines, the alternatives discussed must in-
clude "where relevant, those not within the existing authority of the 
responsible agency."359 The consideration should be rigorous, suffi-
ciently thorough to avoid foreclosure of options "prematurely", and 
should include "the alternative of taking no action or of postponing 
action pending further study. "380 
The Guidelines' interpretation of the requirement is derived from 
the court decisions construing the scope of the requirement. A lead-
ing case for interpreting agency duties to discuss alternatives is 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,381 which con-
cerned the validity of a Department of the Interior EIS issued in 
connection with proposed oil and gas leases in offshore fields near 
Louisiana. In Morton, the EIS had discussed in detail the likely 
impact of the proposed new oil wells and had recognized unavoida-
ble adverse effects of the program. However, it merely mentioned 
other programs through which Interior could deal with the need for 
fuel, and did not evaluate the environmental impact of the alterna-
tives. 
The court found that the failure to offer an environmental analy-
sis of the alternatives was a fatal flaw in the statement: 
We reject the implication of one of the Government's submissions 
which began by stating that while the Act requires a detailed statement 
of alternatives, it 'does not require a discussion of the environmental 
consequences of the suggested alternative.' A sound construction of 
NEPA ... requires a presentation of the environmental risks incident 
to reasonable alternative courses of action.382 
Of course, while the alternatives must be evaluated in detail, the 
task-like others involved in EIS preparation-is not intended to 
become an impossible one for the agency: 
The agency may limit its discussion of environmental impact to a 
brief statement, when that is the case, that the alternative course in-
volves no effect on the environment, or that their effect, briefly de-
scribed, is simply not significant. A rule of reason is implicit in this 
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aspect of the law as it is in the requirement that the agency provide a 
statement concerning those opposing views that are responsible.363 
In addition to the issue of the need for a detailed analysis of the 
environmental impact of alternatives, the court was presented with 
the question of the scope of the alternatives to be considered. Could 
the EIS consideration be limited to those alternatives within the 
agency's jurisdiction, or must any alternative be considered which 
some agency of the federal government could carry out? The court 
decided that it was essential for policy consideration and decision-
making that all alternatives be considered even if the drafting 
agency's authority did not extend to adopting a particular alterna-
tive: 
[W]e do not agree that this requires a limitation to measures the 
agency or official can adopt. This approach would be particularly inap-
posite for the lease sale of offshore oil lands hastened. . . as part of an 
overall program. . . to provide an accomodation of the energy require-
ments of our country with the growing recognition of the necessity to 
protect the environment. The scope of this project is far broader than 
that of other proposed Federal actions discussed in impact statements, 
such as a single canal or dam.3U 
Therefore, where a broad program or policy was to be achieved, 
EIS's prepared in connection with the program must consider all the 
ways of achieving its purpose: 
The Executive's proposed solution to a national problem, or a set of 
inter-related problems, may call for each of several departments or 
agencies to take a specific action; this cannot mean that the only discus-
sion of alternatives required in the ensuing environmental impact state-
ments would be the discussion by each department of the particular 
actions it could take as an alternative to the proposal underlying its 
impact statement. 
When the proposed action is an integral part of a coordinated plan to 
deal with a broad problem, the range of alternatives that must be evalu-
ated is broadened.3la 
A second aspect of the scope of alternatives was discussed by the 
court. Some alternatives would not meet all the goals of the project, 
would not satisfy the time requirements for the proposed action, or 
would otherwise not satisfy all the conditions of the proposed action. 
In such a circumstance, it would be permissible to omit discussion 
of such alternatives, especially if they would occupy different time 
frames: 
We think there is merit to the Government's position insofar as it 
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contends that no additional discussion was requisite for such "alterna-
tives" as the development of oil shale, desulfurization of coal, coalliqui-
fication and gasification, tar sands and geothermal resources. 
The Statement sets forth. . . that while these possibilities hold great 
promise for the future, their impact on the energy supply will not likely 
be felt until after 1980, and will be dependent on environmental safe-
guards and technological developments. Since the Statement also sets 
forth that the agency's proposal was put forward to meet a near-term 
requirement, imposed by an energy shortfall projected for the mid-
1970's, the possibility of the environmental impact of long-term solu-
tions requires no additional discussion at this juncture.3la 
Obviously the concept of alternatives is limited by the legitimate 
goals and objectives of the proposed project. Future desirable solu-
tions, when too remote, are not necessary parts of the consideration 
for projects aimed at short-run solutions. However, the court recog-
nizes that the difficulty of getting approval for an alternative, espe-
cially if long-range legislative action is required, does not justify a 
failure to consider the alternative: 
The mere fact that an alternative requires legislative implementation 
does not automatically establish it as beyond the domain of what is 
required for discussion, particularly since NEPA was intended to pro-
vide a basis for consideration and choice by the decisionmakers in the 
legislature as well as the executive branch. But the need for an overhaul 
of basic legislation certainly bears on the requirements of the Act. We 
do not suppose Congress intended an agency to devote itselfto expanded 
discussion of the environmental impact of alternatives so remote from 
reality as to depend on, say, the repeal of the antitrust laws.387 
This analysis establishes that the agency involved must search for 
reasonable alternatives within the power of the entire federal 
government to carry out within the reasonable time and with a 
possibility of solving the problem for which the proposed project is 
intended. Obviously it leaves a substantial amount of definition and 
discretion to agencies, and has generated substantial litigation and 
court consideration in other cases. 
In Sierra Club v. Froehlke,388 the court considered the discussion 
of alternatives to be "particularly critical because it is usually 
through this medium that mitigation measures may be discov-
ered."389 The court recognized that 
While agencies must consider alternatives to the' "fullest extent pos-
sible", the search for appropriate alternatives need be neither "exhaus-
tive" nor speculative and remote.' Although only those 'reasonably 
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available' need be considered, the discussion and consideration cannot 
be superficial, but must be thoroughly explored.370 
An important issue in Froehlke was whether an alternative must 
offer a complete solution to the problems raised by the proposed 
project. The court decided in the negative: 
It is not necessary that a particular alternative offer a complete solu-
tion to all technical, economic and environmental considerations. If a 
portion of the original purpose of the project, or its reasonably logical 
subcomponent, may be accomplished by other means, then a significant 
portion of the environmental harm attendant to the project as originally 
conceived may be alleviated.371 
The court saw the need for this consideration of partial solutions as 
critical for complex and interdependent projects, since sub-portions 
of projects were most likely to be overwhelmed by the goals and 
plans for the overall program. 
In its analysis of the EIS in the Trinity project, the court set out 
the process by which alternatives should be discussed and consid-
ered: 
The proper method for approaching a consideration of alternatives 
under NEPA is to consider first the primary purposes or functions that 
the project is to serve. Alternatives to each of these projects must then 
be weighed, because it is not appropriate to disregard alternatives 
merely because they do not offer, individually, a complete solution to 
the problem. Furthermore, each of the primary environmentally adverse 
effects must be considered, and alternative approaches to the project 
should be considered with an eye to mitigating each or all of these. The 
purpose of' "breaking" down a project into its beneficial and "detrimen-
tal" components' is to determine whether some significant portion of the 
environmental harm may be alleviated.372 
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers , 373 which 
concerned the EIS of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway project, 
one justification for a limited consideration of alternatives by the 
Corps of Engineers was that alternatives need be developed in detail 
"only where a project involves unresolved, detrimental environmen-
tal impacts."374 The court quickly rejected such a narrow interpreta-
tion of the requirement, finding that all reasonable alternatives 
must be considered to guarantee that the decision-making will be 
made on the broadest basis. 
Among the alternatives which must be considered, it is now clear, 
is the alternative of "no action", of simply not carrying out the 
project.375 Unfortunately, while stated as required in several cases, 
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there has been no detailed discussion of exactly how "no action" is 
to be presented or analyzed. Presumably, the entire discussion of 
impact, adverse effects, alternatives, and the other required sections 
of the EIS are all a consideration of the possibility of no action, and 
are to be included in weighing the decision to carry out some project 
or action. 
6. "The relationship between local, short-term uses of man's envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term prod-
uctivity" 
Neither the Guidelines nor court decisions have offered much 
information about this EIS requirement. However, the requirement 
could be an important one where a program or project is proposed 
to solve an immediate crisis, as in offshore oil lease sales, at the 
expense of long-term fuel needs and short- or long-term injury to an 
area. The discussion which comes closest to dealing with this issue 
can be found in Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP) v. Interstate Commerce Commission,376 which con-
cerned rate setting by the ICC for scrap metal freight on railroads. 
While not mentioning the section at all, the court expressed the 
expectation that the new EIS it ordered the agency to prepare would 
consider the effect of the rates set on short-term and long-term use 
of metal ores and scrap metals, and would consider the environmen-
tal consequences of that effect. 
7. "Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be 
implemented" 
As with Section 5 above, the Guidelines and cases offer little 
information about this required section of the EIS. While the sec-
tion is mentioned as a reason for invalidating an EIS in one case,377 
it is not explained and constitutes only one of ten reasons listed for 
rejecting the EIS involved. 
However, since many projects do use non-renewable resources, or 
cause irreversible injury to resources, the section exists as a poten-
tial ground for finding invalidity if a good faith specification of 
irreversible and irretrievable effects is not included in the EIS. 
Scientists'Institute v. AEC378 made this much clear. In considering 
the need and appropriate timing for an overall program EIS, the 
court was concerned with the fact that a massive investment in one 
new form of technology for developing electric power would utilize 
54 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
scarce resources and would simultaneously absorb so much avail-
able capital as to block exploration of other potential sources of 
power. The result, if an EIS were not required early in the program, 
would be an irretrievable commitment of resources with a long-term 
significant effect on the environment without environmental plan-
ning. The court specifically required the EIS to discuss such issues 
within the context of this section. 
C. Other Rights Created by NEPA 
While the action-forcing § .102(2)(C) requiring an environmental 
impact statement has been the major source of litigation and the 
major section affecting federal agency behavior under NEPA, some 
decisions have considered agency duties arising under other parts of 
the Act. 
[Alll agencies of the Federal Government shall-rAJ utilize a sys-
tematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated 
use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design 
arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact 
on man's environment. 379 
Several courts have analyzed agency actions in light of the agency 
duty to utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach in conduct-
ing the environmental exploration. 
Hanly v. Kleindienst Ipso considered the meaning of § 102 (2)(A) 
listed above, as well as an important threshold issue under § 
l02(2)(C) of NEPA. The Federal Government, when its action was 
challenged on the basis that an interdisciplinary approach was lack-
ing, claimed that such an approach was necessary only if a major 
action significantly affecting the environment was involved. The 
court found that such an interpretation of NEPA would be too nar-
row and that § 102(2)(A), unlike § l02(2)(C), applied to any federal 
action.38) 
The court concluded, however, that an interdisciplinary approach 
had in fact been followed by the agency in the challenged action. 
Since to plan the urban building the agency retained architects who 
took "into account the aesthetics and the tangible factors involved 
in the designing and planning"382 of the project, the interdisciplinary 
requirement was satisfied. 
In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power 
Commission,383 the court applied this section to plans for a power 
plant along the Hudson River in New York State. NEPA had heen 
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passed during the consideration of the environmental effects of the 
proposed project, but was held to be applicable to the project. The 
court found that public hearings at which a substantial number of 
witnesses with expertise in virtually all environmental disciplines 
testified had satisfied the requirement for a systematic, interdisci-
plinary approach by the agency.384 
The court in Akers v. Resor385 noted that where there are other 
agencies available with expertise, such agencies must be consulted 
to satisfy the interdisciplinary approach requirements. 
Probably the most explicit explanation of this requirement is of-
fered in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,386 
which concerned a proposed connecting waterway between two riv-
ers. 
The systematic, interdisciplinary approach of § 102(2)(A) is designed 
to assure better programs and a better environment by bringing together 
the skills of the biologist, the geologist, the ecologist, the engineer, and 
landscape architect, the economist, the sociologist, and the other disci-
plines relevant to the project. The mandated approach makes planning 
no longer the sole concern of the engineer and the cost analyst, and 
assures consideration of the relationships between man and his sur-
roundings.387 
The court analyzed how this approach was utilized by the Corps 
of Engineers. A task force of scientists was created" ... having 
expertise in water resources planning, sanitary and civil engineering 
and various phases of biology and ecology. . . . [T]he team, to-
gether with other Corps scientists ... used in consultation, repre-
sented an adequate range of relevant sciences and possessed the 
capability to make an interdisciplinary approach."388 The task force 
worked for six months, " ... gathering data from the Corps' files 
and outside sources, and consulting about 60 persons or agencies in 
the representative fields of mammalogy, herpetology, ornithology, 
aquatic invertebrates and plankton, entomology and vertebrate 
ecology, ichthyology, water and air quality, and other sciences."389 
The task force requested information from federal and state agen-
cies and the public, and attempted to put the information into a 
coherent analysis of the environment and likely impacts and prob-
lems. 
In broad outline, therefore, subsection (A) requires federal agen-
cies to use an interdisciplinary approach to environmental consider-
ations and carry out a thorough analysis of all their actions utilizing 
relevant disciplines. 
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[AJll agencies of the Federal Government shall-. ... (B) Iden-
tify and develop methods and procedures. . . which will insure that 
presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be 
given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with eco-
nomic and technical considerations. 390 
One problem with modern decision-making is that quantifiable 
values and considerations usually become the basis for a decision, 
overwhelming non-quantified aspects of the problem. This section 
was drafted to require federal agencies to begin to quantify, and 
thus consider, environmental values, thereby avoiding the undesira-
ble effects of decision-making made on an unduly narrow basis. 391 
The meaning of this section is most completely considered in the 
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of 
Engineers.392 Plaintiffs attacked the decision of the Corps of Engi-
neers to build a connecting waterway on the basis of a Corps failure 
to include a "rational scheme of values" in the consideration of the 
environmental aspects of the proposed project. The Corps had in-
cluded in the benefits side of its analysis environmental benefits 
such as recreation, but failed to include any environmental factors 
on the loss side. 
The court found that the effect of § l02(2)(B) is to: 
order no more than that an agency search out, develop and follow proce-
dures reasonably calculated to bring environmental factors to peer sta-
tus with dollars and technology in their decisionmaking. We agree with 
the ultimate thrust of the district court's legal and factual conclusion, 
which was that the Corps' methodology satisfied subsection (B) by mak-
ing a good faith attempt to weight and weigh ecology in reaching its 
ultimate approva1.393 
The section does not 
command an agency to develop or define any general or specific quanti-
fication process. Plaintiffs concede that compliance with this subsection 
does not require that every environmental amenity be reduced to an 
integer capable of insertion into a "go-no go" equation. They must fur-
ther acknowledge that many environmental values cannot be fixed even 
within a given project area, and that others are bound to vary in value 
from place to place and time to time.394 
Thus, this section would seem to require a good faith effort only, 
and not a complete quantification of environmental values prior to 
project decision-making-an effort which, under the present limited 
capabilities of the ecological and social sciences, would probably be 
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impossible in any event. Earlier cases generally are in accord with 
this approach.395 In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of 
Engineers,396 the court found that the Corps had not developed 
quantification standards for environmental factors, and had not 
fully taken such factors into account in its decision-making process. 
However, the court refused to find the EIS insufficient on those 
grounds, because 
The NEPA does not require the impossible. Nor would it require, in 
effect, a moratorium on all projects which had an environmental impact 
while awaiting compliance with § 102(2)(B). It would suffice ifthe state-
ment pointed out this deficiency. The decisionmakers could then deter-
mine whether any purpose would be served in delaying the project while 
awaiting the development of such criteria.397 
In Akers v. Resor,398 however, the court stated that the section 
requires development of "general methods and procedures to insure 
that unquantified values are given due consideration."399 It found 
that the Corps of Engineers had failed in its duty to comply with 
this section, because it had not developed the quantification system 
and had not, in the alternative, made in-depth studies of the envi-
ronmental considerations and values so they could be considered at 
all. The Corps had merely ignored some important values!oo 
The case which goes farthest in requiring quantification, and of-
fers the most detailed discussion of cost-benefit analysis, is the sub-
sequently reversed district court opinion in Sierra Club v. 
Froehlke. 401 The court considered in detail all parts of the cost-
benefit analysis performed by the Corps and found it insufficient to 
satisfy NEPA. The Corps had failed to justify figures used for bene-
fits, failed to include detriments, and generally used questionable 
methods. On this basis, among others, the court ordered a new 
analysis and EIS to be prepared. In its analysis, the court recognized 
that "sophisticated techniques" were not available for environmen-
tal quantification. However, unlike its counterparts in the cases 
discussed above, the court felt that these 
. . . interim alternative methods should be explored. . . to insure that 
we do not unnecessarily jeopardize the intent ofNEPA between now and 
the time that agencies and ultimately the courts are supplied with ap-
propriate standards for evaluating the comparative degree of benefits 
and costS. 402 
It is fair to say that the general court interpretation of this section 
is that it has set a goal which reasonably must be complied with by 
agencies. However, except possibly for one court, no strict require-
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ment exists making quantification a condition precedent to contin-
ued agency action. 
D. Substantive Rights Under NEPA 
A question frequently raised by opponents of agency decisions is 
whether NEPA has created any substantive rights which might be 
enforced to reverse federal agency decisions, once NEPA's proce-
dural requirements have been met. The opponent to agency action 
will usually state that NEPA creates a right to a safe or clean envi-
ronment, and that the agency decision is invalid because it violates 
that right and will lead to degradation of the environment. A court 
would probably reach this claim only after it had found that the 
agency had drafted an acceptable EIS and met all other procedural 
requirements, so that only a decision finding substantive rights and 
a violation of them would prevent the action. While this issue has 
been frequently litigated, the courts sharply disagree concerning 
whether substantive rights exist, and to what extent courts may 
enforce them. 403 
1. Cases denying the existence of substantive rights 
A leading case denying that courts may review the merits of the 
ultimate agency decision is Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Armstrong,404 which concerned the proposed New Melones Dam pro-
ject in California. When faced with the question of the extent of its 
review of the project, once it had found the EIS sufficient, the court 
stated: 
We do not read the National Environmental Protection [sic] Act to 
give to the courts the ultimate authority to approve or disapprove con-
struction of a properly authorized project where an adequate EIS has 
been prepared and circulated in accordance with the NEPA require-
ments. There has been some uncertainty in the views of other courts 
upon this issue. [cites omitted] We have taken the view that final 
judgments of project justification are not subject to review in an action 
to consider the adequacy of an EIS statement under NEPA. [cite omit-
ted] Congress in reauthorizing the project and in determining whether 
to proceed in the light of the EIS must consider many other factors in 
addition to the environmental effects. These questions are not before us 
and properly SO}05 
An articulate exposition of the reasons why courts will not find 
substantive rights in NEPA is offered by Judge Eisele of the U.S. 
District Court in Arkansas in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps 
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of Engineers. 406 Although the decision was reversed on this point by 
the Circuit Court,407 it still has utility as an example of the views of 
courts which have found no substantive rights inherent in NEPA. 
Judge Eisele was faced with an argument which he characterized 
as claiming that NEPA 
. . . creates rights in the plaintiffs and others to "safe, healthful, pro-
ductive and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;" and to 
"an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual 
choice," and "the widest range of beneficial values."408 
The judge could not accept the thesis that such rights were created: 
The Act appears to reflect a compromise which, in the opinion of the 
Court, falls short of creating the type of "substantive rights" claimed 
by the plaintiffs. Apparently the sponsors could obtain agreement only 
upon an Act which declared the national environmental policy. This 
represents a giant step, but just a step. It is true that the Act required 
the government 'to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, 
programs, and resources,' but it does not purport to vest in the plain-
tiffs, or anyone else, a 'right' to the type of environment envisioned 
therein .... No reasonable interpretation of the Act would permit this 
conclusion. If the Congress had intended to leave it to the courts to 
determine such matters; if, indeed, it had intended to give up its own 
prerogatives and those of the executive agencies in this respect, it cer-
tainly would have used explicit language to accomplish such a far-
reaching objective.40' 
In Judge Eisele's view, NEPA had created procedural requirements 
concerning the drafting of an EIS; but in other sections of the Act, 
Congress had merely stated a policy and hope for the future which 
could not be translated into substantive rights and duties. 410 
A third major case denying the existence of substantive rights, 
Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke,4I1 was also sub-
sequently reversed by the Circuit Court. The District Court was 
faced with an attack on the decision to build The New Hope Dam, 
a project very similar to the Gillham Dam. It decided the require-
ments of NEPA "provide only procedural remedies instead of sub-
stantive rights .... Therefore the Court cannot substitute its 
opinion as to whether the project should be undertaken or not."412 
As far as this court was concerned, the function of NEP A and the 
requirement for drafting an EIS was to provide environmental "full 
disclosure"; to enable decision-makers to consider alternatives to 
the project, "adverse effects, mistakes in calculations and reasons 
that the dam should not be built"413 together with justifications for 
the project. 
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But, according to the court, NEPA did not empower courts to 
decide if the project should be built: 
The role of this Court, and indeed all courts, is to require compliance 
with the law. What is best to be done along the environs of the New 
Hope and Haw Rivers is a judgment matter for Congress, and the Court 
must be careful not to substitute its judgment as to what is best. It is 
clear that NEPA was not intended to be a means for the Courts to 
second guess congressional appropriations, but was intended to be a 
means of disclosing to Congress and other decisionmakers all environ-
mental factors in order that decisions and appropriations could be made 
with as little adverse effect on the environment as possible,414 
2. Cases finding substantive rights under NEPA 
A series of cases has denied that NEPA is limited to procedural 
aspects. The first case to state that limited substantive rights had 
been created by NEPA was Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee 
v. Atomic Energy Commission.U5 In discussing the impact ofNEPA, 
the court found that substantive review was proper, at least where 
an arbitrary decision ignoring environmental information had been 
made: 
We conclude, then, that Section 102 of NEPA mandates a particular 
sort of careful and informed decisionmaking process and creates judi-
cially enforceable duties. The reviewing courts probably cannot reverse 
a substantive decision on its merits, under Section 102, unless it be 
shown that the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was 
arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values. 
[emphasis added]41' 
The watershed case, however, is Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Corps of Engineers417 reversing Judge Eisele. In EDF, the Circuit 
Court stated: "The language of NEPA, as well as its Legislative 
history, make it clear that the Act is more than an environmental 
full-disclosure law. NEPA was intended to affect substantive 
changes in decisionmaking."418 Mter reviewing the procedural sec-
tion of NEPA discussed supra,419 the court found a duty for agencies 
to carry out a "careful and informed decision-making process"420 
and to include therein environmental factors along with economic 
and technical ones. 
The court then considered the duties of courts to review agency 
decisions: 
Given an agency obligation to carry out the substantive requirements 
of the Act, we believe that courts have an obligation to review substan-
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tive agency decisions on the merits. Whether we look to common law or 
the Administrative Procedure Act, absent "legislative guidance as to 
reviewability, an administrative determination affecting legal rights is 
reviewable unless some special reason appears for not reviewing." [cite 
omitted] Here, important legal rights are affected. NEPA is silent as 
to judicial review, and no special reasons appear for not reviewing the 
decision of the agency. To the contrary, the prospect of substantive 
review should improve the quality of agency decisions and should make 
it more likely that the broad purpose of NEPA will be realized.421 
A description then followed of the standard of review to be applied 
to substantive decisions: 
The reviewing court must first determine whether the agency acted 
within the scope of its authority, and next whether the decision reached 
was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law. In making the latter determination, the court must 
decide if the agency failed to consider all relevant factors in reaching its 
decision, or if the decision itself represented a clear error in judgment. 
Where NEPA is involved, the reviewing court must first determine if 
the agency reached its decision after a full, good faith consideration and 
balancing of environmental factors. The court must then determine, 
according to the standards set forth in §§ 101(b) and 102 (1) of the Act, 
whether 'the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was 
arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values.'422 
The court maintained that it was not authorizing a total review 
of the agency decision: "Although this inquiry into the facts is to 
be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narroW 
one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that 
of the agency. "423 
The Eighth Circuit continued its analysis of substantive review 
in Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke,424 which concerned the 
Cache River channelization project. In Froelke, the court affirmed 
the narrow standard of review of substantive decisions it had stated 
ought to be utilized. In addition, it was faced with a new agency 
defense that even limited review should not be conducted where the 
Congress has appropriated funds for the project after the EIS has 
been filed and the final agency decision has been made. In rejecting 
that contention, the court ruled that a Congressional appropriation 
would not overcome the substantive requirements of NEPA: 
"NEPA requires that construction projects be completed in accord-
ance with its substantive provisions. An appropriation act cannot 
serve as a vehicle to change that requirement. "425 While agreeing 
that substantive review was proper, the Fifth Circuit in 
/' 
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Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers426 disagreed 
with the latter conclusion of the Eighth Circuit. The court held that 
where Congress has made a decision that a project should be built, 
there would be no review of that decision: "This informed and delib-
erate legislative action, while not barring court review for proce-
dural compliance, nevertheless effectively supplants the Corps' rec-
ommendation that the project be built. Hence, even severely cir-
cumscribed judicial review is both inappropriate and unneces-
sary."427 
The Fifth Circuit extended its analysis in Sierra Club v. 
Callaway.428 After the District Court had enjoined construction of a 
dam due to an insufficient EIS, the Report of the relevant Senate 
Committee deleted funding for the project from the appropriations 
bill. The 1974 Appropriations Act, however, restored funds for the 
project on the basis of a House-Senate Conference Committee 
agreement.429 Because of this Congressional action, the Court rea-
soned that 
The course of Congressional hearings discloses a firm and determined 
policy on the part of that body that Wallisville go forward on its own to 
final completion. With full knowledge of the detriments and benefits of 
the project, the stage of completion, the outstanding injunction, and the 
objections to further construction, its deliberate action in reaffirming 
the Wallisville Project should not escape notice}30 
Thus, even where courts agree that substantive rights have been 
created, they disagree whether Congressional approval of a project 
through the appropriations process will eliminate the substantive 
review by the court. 
In summary, the trend of judicial opinion appears to support the 
existence of substantive rights under NEPA. Those rights, which are 
based on Sections 101 and 102 of NEPA, constitute additionallimi-
tations on the actions and decision-making of federal agencies. The 
agency must make rational decisions which are not arbitrary or 
capricious or clearly injurious to the environment without sufficient 
balancing justifications. It is not yet determined, however, how far 
courts will delve into agency decisions once the substantive rights 
have been asserted. 
In addition, it is not yet clear whether Congressional approval of 
a project through the appropriations process, after environmental 
analysis has been completed, will be sufficient to insulate the 
agency decision from substantive judicial review. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
NEPA has had a remarkable history. In the first five years since 
its passage an entire specialty oflaw has developed around its provi-
sions and its implications for federal activities and programs. This 
article has presented an overview of the administrative and judicial 
interpretations which directly affect the workings of the federal bu-
reaucracy. However, it is clear that there are many areas in which 
confusion reigns and many subjects on which there are strong differ-
ences of opinion, even among the courts. The "NEPA common law" 
will continue to develop through a large volume of litigation. Hope-
fully, judicial decisions will soon clarify the obligations of federal 
agencies in ambiguous areas and will develop workable standards 
for environmental evaluation and protection. 
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apply to all federal agencies and federal action. Only the much-
litigated EIS requirement of §102(2)(C) is limited in its application 
to "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment." 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C) (1970). 
151 See, cases discussed in text at n. 156-182 infra. 
152 See, cases discussed in text at n. 183-217 infra. 
153 Id. 
154 See, cases discussed in text at n. 218-230 infra. 
155 Very few such cases have found that no federal action is in-
volved. See, text at n. 163-182 infra. In no case has a court made a 
finding of no federal action where a federal agency was actually 
carrying out a project or taking part in its construction directly. See, 
YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, at 21-22, for a list of cases in which there 
has been a finding of no federal action. See also Brown, E., Applying 
NEPA to Joint Federal and Non-Federal Projects, in this issue of 
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
158 YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, at 21. The question of what constitutes 
federal action is also analyzed in Comment, The Role of the Courts 
Under NEPA, 23 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 300, 306-312 (1973) (herein-
after cited as ROLE OF COURTS); ANDERSON, supra n. 6, at 56-73. 
157 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973). 
158 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974); discussed in Note, The Applica-
tion of Federal Environmental Standards to the General Revenue 
Sharing Program, 60 VA. L. REv. 114 (1974). 
159 497 F.2d 252, 257 (4th Cir. 1974). 
180 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972). 
181 335 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (D.N.Mex. 1971). 
182 See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic 
Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Greene County 
Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). 
183 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972). YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, at 22, also 
considers the case surprising. 
184 464 F.2d 254, 258. 
185Id. 
188 464 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
187 Id., at 803. 
188 374 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. 111. 1974). 
189 Id., at 772. 
170 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973). 
17\ Id., at 16-17. 
172 463 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972). 
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173 497 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1974). 
174 The court states: "Efforts by environmentalists to preserve our 
natural habitat ... cannot help but strike a sympathetic chord. 
Indeed, this is particularly true where, as here, this laudable pur-
pose appears frustrated by a federal statutory scheme which, de-
spite its lofty aims, provides a mere chimera of environmental pro-
tection. Although appellants evoke our empathy and full under-
standing of their justifiable frustrations, we can find nothing in the 
law to justify reversal ... " [d., at 1142. 
175 [d., at 1147. 
178 [d. 
177 376 F.Supp. 806 (D. Conn. 1974). 
178 See, Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F.Supp. 731 (D. 
Conn. 1972). 
179 See, Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. Secretary of 
Transportation, 363 F.Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973). 
180 484 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973). 
181 [d., at 1148. 
182 [d. 
183 YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, at 22-24. See also, ANDERSON, supra n. 
6, at 73-105. 
184 See, text at n. 188-200 infra. See, Hanly v. Kleindienst, 460 
F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972) and text at n. 192-197 infra. 
185 See, text at n. 188-299 infra. See also, Minnesota PIRG v. 
Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974) and text at n. 188-191 infra. 
188 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 
470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
187 See, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), concerning federal action and the AEC. See, 
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971), 
where the court found that the decision of the Interior Department 
to end helium purchase was a major federal action which would 
require the drafting of an environmental impact statement. 
1.88 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). 
189 [d., at 1319. 
190 [d., at 1321. 
191 [d., at 1321-22. 
192 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
The case came up originally as Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 409 U.S. 
990 (1972). In addition, the case was before the Second Circuit a 
third time in 1973 concerning the denial of a temporary injunction, 
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484 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973). Hanly is discussed at length in Com-
ment, NEPA, EIS and the Hanly Litigation: To File or Not to File, 
48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 522 (1973); Comment, Threshold Determinations 
under NEPA, 5 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 380 (1974). 
193 471 F.2d 823, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1972). 
194 Id., at 830. 
195 Id., at 830-31. 
198 460 F .2d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1972). 
197 Id., 'at 647-48. 
198 353 F.Supp. 520 (S.D. Ohio 1972). 
199 Id., at 540. 
200 Id. 
201 Id., at 541. 
202 344 F.Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972). 
203 Id., at 578. 
204 350 F.Supp. 310 (N.D. W.Va. 1972). 
205 Id., at 322-23. 
208 Julis v. Cedar Rapids, 349 F.Supp. 88 (N.D. Iowa 1972). 
207 Id., at 89-90. 
208 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973). 
209 Id., at 426-27. 
210 372 F.Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1974). 
211 Id., at 936-37. 
212 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn 1973). 
213 Id., at 349-50. 
214 Id., at 351. 
215 See, Howard v. Environmental Protection Agency, 4 BNA 
ENVIRONMENT REpORTER CASES 1731 (D. W.Va. 1972), concerning a 
sewage treatment plant; Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 
F.Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972), concerning the use of a state park as the 
site for military maneuvers; Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 
1973), concerning a proposed marina and fishing piers on the North 
Carolina Coast. See also, YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, at 24. 
218 363 F.Supp. 466 (D. D.C. 1973). 
217 Id., at 472-73. 
218 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). 
219 Id., at 1322. 
220 Id. 
221 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 990 (1972). 
See, supra n. 192. 
222 Id., at 827. 
223 Id., citing Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640,647 (2d Cir. 1972). 
224 Id., at 833. 
225 Id., at 834. 
NEPA'S FIRST FIVE YEARS 73 
228 6 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER CASES 1065 (S.D. Cal. 1973). 
227 Id., at 1067. 
228 372 F.Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973); the case is discussed in Note, 
Factors to be Considered in Making a Threshold Determination that 
an Environmental Impact Statement is Necessary Under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969,2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 419, 
431 (1974). See also, Daffron, C., Using NEPA to Exclude the Poor, 
which appears in this issue of ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
229 372 F.Supp. 147, 148-49. 
230 Id., at 149. 
231 CEQ GUIDELINES, 40 C.F.R. §1500.2(a) (July 1974). 
232 YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, at 24. 
233 This difficulty will be a continuing problem during at least this 
decade, since many major activities often take ten or fifteen years 
or even longer from conception to completion. See, e.g., Sierra Club 
v. Froehlke, 359 F.Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), which concerns the 
Trinity River Basin project. The project can be traced back to the 
time of the Civil War and has been studied, started, abandoned and 
restudied throughout the 20th century. See, ANDERSON, supra n. 6, 
at 142-78. 
234 See, text supra at n. 233. 
235 Citizens for Clean Air v. Corps of Engineers, 349 F.Supp. 696, 
708 (S.D. N.Y. 1972). 
238 CEQ GUIDELINES, 40 C.F.R. §1500.7(a) (July 1974). 
237 Id. 
238 See generally, text supra at nn. 43-92. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
242 See, Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F.Supp. 1289, 1322-23 (S.D. 
Tex. 1973); Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 
F.2d 1323, 1331 (4th Cir. 1972). See also, ANDERSON, supra n. 6, at 
142-78. 
243 359 F.Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973). 
244 The court analyzed the history of the project in detail at 359 
F.Supp. at 1299-1305, 1311-1322. 
245 359 F.Supp. 1289, 1309. 
248 Id., at 1384-85. 
247 Id., at 1322. 
248 Id., at 1323. 
----~-- --
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249 Id. 
250 Id., at 1384-85. 
251 6 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER CASES 2080 (5th Cir. 1974). 
252 The decision states that "the rule against segmentation for EIS 
purposes is not an imperative to be applied in every case. Its appli-
cation vel non may depend on the scope of the project." Id., at 2083. 
In addition, the court noted that "practical necessity" as shown by 
different stages of planning might excuse the lack of an overall EIS. 
Id. 
253 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000. 
254 Id., at 1328. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id., at 1331. 
259 Id., at 1332. 
260 454 F.2d 613 (3rd Cir. 1971). 
261 Id., at 616. 
262 Id., at 624. 
263 Similar cases include San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 342 
F.Supp. 77 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd in part, 472 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 
1972); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 
1973). See, ANDERSON, supra n. 6, at 152-56; YARRINGTON, supra n. 
1, at 25. 
264 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See, YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, 
at 25. See also, Note, Agency May Be Required to File Environmen-
tal Impact Statement for Research and Development Program as a 
Whole Even Though General Implementation of the Technology 
Involved is Remote, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1050 (1974); Comment, NEPA 
Applied to Policy-Level Decisionmaking, 3 ECOLOGY L. Q. 799 
(1973). 
265 481 F.2d at 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
266 Id., at 1084. 
267 Id., at 1088. 
268 Id., at 1089-90. 
269 Id., at 1093. 
270 Id., at 1093-94. 
271 Id., at 1094. 
272 Id., at 1094-95. 
273 Id., at 1085. 
274 The negative declaration is discussed in Hanly v. Kleindienst, 
471 F.2d 823,836 (2d Cir. 1972). See also, Maryland National Capi-
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tal Park and Planning Commission v. Postal Service, 487 F.2d 1029, 
1039-41 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. 
Tex. 1974); Nadar v. Butterfield, 373 F. Supp. 1175 (D. D.C. 1974). 
See, Comment, Judicial Review of a NEPA Negative Statement, 53 
B.U. L. REV. 879 (1973). 
275 See, text supra at n. 149-230. 
276 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 
325 F.Supp. 749, 759 (KD. Ark. 1971). 
277 Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. 
Postal Service, 487 F.2d 1029, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
278 Id., at 1040. Nadar v. Butterfield, 373 F.Supp. 1175 (D. D.C. 
1974) also uses this analysis. 
279 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom., Hanly v. 
Kleindienst, 409 U.S. 990 (1972). 
280 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
281 The text is set out in 460 F .2d 640, 645-46. 
282 Id., at 647. 
283 471 F .2d 823, 836. 
284 Id., at 832-36. 
285 Id., at 832. 
286 370 F.Supp. 5 (S.D. Tex. 1974). 
287 Id., at 17. 
288 Id., at 18. 
289 See, text supra at n. 20, where NEPA §102(2)(C) appears in 
full. 
290 NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970); CEQ GUIDELINES, 40 
C.F.R. § 1500.7(c) (July 1974). See, YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, at 17-
20; ANDERSON, supra n. 6, at 186-96. See also, Comment, The Prepa-
ration of an Environmental Impact Statement by State Highway 
Commissions, 58 IOWA L. REV. 1268 (1973). 
291 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). 
292 Id., at 416. 
293 Id., at 420. 
294 Id., at 422. 
295 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973). 
296 Id., at 629. 
297 Id., at 631. 
298 Id., at 632. 
299 372 F. Supp. 223 (D. Conn. 1974). 
300 466 F .2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972). 
301 346 F. Supp. 244 (KD. Wis. 1972). 
302 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), stay vacated by U.S. Supreme 
---------------------- ---------
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Court, 6 BNA ENVmONMENT REPORTER CASES 1047, cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 1052 (1974). 
303 485 F.2d at 467. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
308 6 BNA ENVIRONMENT REpORTER CASES 1047 (1974). 
307 Id., at 1048. 
308 6 BNA ENvmONMENT REPORTER CASES 1320 (M.D. Fla. 1974). 
308 Id., at 1325. 
310Id. 
3\1 Id., at 1326. 
312 7 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER CASES 1033 (5th Cir. 1974). 
313 Id., at 1042. 
314 Id. 
315 The cases are listed and discussed in YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, 
at 17-20. 
318 487 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1973). 
317 Id., at 854. 
318 449 F.2d. 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, 
at 25-27; ANDERSON, supra n. 6, at 200-214. 
318 449 F.2d. at 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
320 Id., at 1114. 
321 Id., at 1115. 
322 Id., at 1118. 
323 482 F.2d. 1282 (1st Cir. 1973). 
324 Id., at 1284-1285. 
325 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970), 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 
1971), 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd in part, 470 F.2d. 
289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). See, IMPACT 
OF IMPACT STATEMENTS, supra n. 5, at 200-202. 
328 325 F. Supp. 728, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1970). 
327 Id. 
328 Id. 
328 Id., at 759-763. 
330 486 F.2d. 946 (7th Cir. 1973). 
331 Id., at 951. 
332 342 F.Supp. 1211, 1217 (E.D.Ark. 1972). See, supra n. 325. 
333 486 F.2d. 946, 951 (7th Cir. 1973). 
334 Id. Accord, Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engi-
neers, 492 F.2d. 1123 (5th Cir. 1974). 
335 Brooks v. Volpe has a lengthy history: 319 F.Supp. 90 (W.D. 
Wash. 1970); 329 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Wash. 1971); aff'd. 460 F.2d. 
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1193 (9th Cir. 1971); 350 F.Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972); 350 
F .Supp. 287 (W.D. Wash. 1972). 
338 350 F. Supp. 269, 277-278 (W.D. Wash. 1972). 
337 [d., at 276-277. 
338 See, CEQ GUIDELINES, 40 C.F.R. §1500.8(a)(1) and (2)(1974). 
See also, YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, at 27. 
339 364 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Ala. 1973). 
340 [d., at 521. 
341 325 F.Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970, 1971); see, supra n. 325. 
342 [d., at 748. 
343 [d., at 747. 
344 350 F.Supp. 262 (W.D. Wash. 1972), vacated and remanded, 
455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971), modified on rehearing, 455 F.2d 1122 
(9th Cir. 1971). 
345 350 F. Supp. 262, 266 (W.D. Wash. 1972). 
348 [d. Accord, 1-291 Why? Association v. Burns, 372 F.Supp. 223 
(D. Conn. 1974). 
347 359 F.Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973). 
348 The district court was reversed by the Fifth Circuit in Sierra 
Club v. Callaway, 6 BNA ENVIRONMENT REpORTER CASES 2080 (5th 
Cir. 1974) on other grounds. In its opinion, the reversing court spe-
cifically found that the EIS was inadequate and ordered the Corps 
of Engineers to submit a revised or supplemental statement. [d., at 
2088-89. 
348 325 F.Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
350 [d., at 761. 
351 359 F.Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973). 
352 CEQ GUIDELINES, 40 C.F.R. §1500.8(a)(5)(1974). 
353 [d. See also, YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, at 27-28. 
354 355 F.Supp. 280 (E.D. N.C. 1973). 
355 355 F .Supp. 280, 287. 
358 [d., at 288-289. 
357 Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F.Supp. 1289, 1339 (S.D.Tex. 
1973). 
358 Daly v. Volpe, 350 F.Supp. 252, 258 (W.D. Wash. 1972). 
358 CEQ GUIDELINES, 40 C.F.R. §1500.8(a)(4)(1974). 
380 [d. For an analysis of alternatives see YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, 
at 28-29; IMPACT OF IMPACT STATEMENTS, supra n. 5, at 208-222. 
381 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1971). History: 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.C. 
1971), 337 F.Supp. 167 (D. D.C. 1971), 337 F.Supp. 170 (D. D.C. 
1972). See, Note, NEPA: The Purpose and Scope of the Duty to 
Discuss Alternatives, 1974 URBAN L. J. 390; Lukey, J., NEPA's [m-
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pact Statement in the Federal Courts: NRDC v. Morton, 2 ENV. 
AFF. 807 (1973). 
362 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C.Cir. 1971). 
363 Id. 
364 Id., at 834-835. See, IMPACT OF IMPACT STATEMENTS, supra, n. 
5, at 212-215. 
365 Id., at 835. 
366 Id., at 837. See, IMPACT OF IMPACT STATEMENTS, supra n. 5, at 
215-218. 
367 Id. 
368 359 F.Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973). This decision was reversed 
on other grounds by the Fifth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Callaway, 6 
BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER CASES 2080 (5th Cir. 1974). The 
reversing court did not consider in detail why the EIS was in-
adequate, but did agree with the District Court that it was 
inadequate. Id., at 2088-89. 
369 Id., at 1343. 
370 Id., at 1344. 
371 Id. 
372 Id., at 1353-1354. 
373 492 F.2d. 1123 (5th Cir. 1974). 
374 Id., at 1135. 
375 Discussion of the "no action" alternative was required in Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d. 289, 297 
(8th Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1011-1012 (E.D. Tenn. N. Div. 1973), 
aff'd, 492 F.2d 466 (1974); Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Stamm, 6 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER CASES 1525, (E.D. Cal. 
1974). 
376 346 F.Supp. 189 (D. D.C. 1972); 353 F. Supp. 317 (D. D.C. 
1973), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); 371 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1974). See, 
YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, at 29. 
377 Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. 
Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
378 481 F.2d 1079, 1089-1090. (D.C. Cir. 1973). See, articles cited 
supra n. 264. 
379 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(A) (1970). See, YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, at 
30-32. 
380 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
381 Id., at 835. 
382 Id. 
383 453 F.2d. 463 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 932 (1972). 
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384 Id., at 481. 
385 339 F.Supp. 1375 (W.D.Tenn. 1972); subsequent opinion at 4 
BNA ENVIRONMENT REpORTER CASES 1966 (W.D. Tenn. 1972). 
388 384 F.Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th 
Cir. 1974). 
387 Id., at 927-928. 
388 Id., at 928-929. 
388 Id., at 929. 
390 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(B) (1970). 
381 See, testimony of Senator Jackson, quoted in Calvert Cliffs' 
Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,1113 n. 9 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). 
382 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974). 
393 Id., at 1133. 
394 Id. 
395 YARRINGTON, supra n. 1, at 31. See also, Anderson, F., NEPA 
and Federal Decision Making 3 ELI ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 
50099, 50100-02, 50104-06 (1973) (hereinafter cited as NEPA AND 
FEDERAL DECISION MAKING). 
398 325 F.Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
397 Id., at 758. 
398 4 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER CASES 1966 (W.D. Tenn. 1972). 
399 Id., at 1968. 
400 Id. 
401 359 F.Supp. 1289(S.D. Tex. 1973). The decision was reversed 
on other grounds by the Fifth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Callaway, 6 
BNA ENVmONMENT REpORTER CASES 2089 (5th Cir. 1974). The re-
versing court agreed that the EIS was inadequate but didn't analyze 
the details of the EIS. Id., at 2088-89. 
402 Id., at 1381. 
403 Substantive rights under NEPA are discussed in YARRINGTON, 
supra n. 1, at 37-41; NEPA AND FEDERAL DECISION MAKING, supra 
n.395, at 50102-04; Arnold, The Substantive Right to Environmen-
tal Quality Under NEPA, 3 ELI ENvmoNMENTAL LAW REPORTER 
50028 (1973); Yarrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Decisions: 
A Second Generation of Cases under NEPA, 19 SOUTH DAKOTA L. 
REV. 279 (1974); Note, The Eighth Circuit Moves a Step Closer to 
Recognition of a Substantive Right to a Clean Environment, 7 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 105 (1973); Comment, Substantive Review 
Under NEPA: EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 3 ECOLOGY L. Q. 173 
(1973); Comment, The Role of the Courts Under NEPA, 23 
CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 300, 316-19 (1973); IMPACT OF IMPACT 
STATEMENTS, supra n. 5, at 242-46. 
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404 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973). Accord, National Helium Corp. 
v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); Pizitz v. Volpe, 467 F.2d 
208 (5th Cir. 1972). 
405 487 F.2d 814, 822 n.13 (9th Cir. 1973). 
408 325 F.Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
407 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). 
408 325 F.Supp. 749, 755 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
401 Id. 
410 Accord, Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F .Supp. 
1401, 1404 (D. D.C. 1971); C~mservation Council of North Carolina 
v. Froehlke, 340 F.Supp. 222 (M.D. N.C. 1972). 
411 340 F.Supp. 222 (M.D. N.C. 1972), reversed, 473 F.2d 664 (4th 
Cir. 1973). 
412 340 F.Supp. at 225. 
413 Id., at 226. 
414 Id., at 228. 
415 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
418 Id., at 1115. 
417 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
See, Comment, Substantive Review Under NEPA: EDF v. Corps of 
Engineers, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 173 (1973). Accord, Conservation Coun-
cil of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973); 
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 950-53 (7th Cir. 1973). 
418 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972). 
419 See text supra at n. 19-23. 
420 470 F.2d 289, 298, quoting Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). 
421 Id., at 298-99. 
422 Id., at 300. 
423 Id., at 300, quoting the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
424 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972). 
425 Id., at 353-54. 
428 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974). 
427 Id., at 1141. 
428 6 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER CASES 2080 (5th Cir. 1974). 
429 Id., at 2085. 
430 Id. The court cites its earlier decision in Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974), 
which is discussed in text supra at n. 426. 
